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Climate change, and the world’s response, has recently 
again been thrust on to the Federal Government’s 
agenda, notwithstanding a current focus on economic 
management.
Internationally the United States has flagged a sharp 
policy response to carbon emissions while domestically 
the Australian Government faces a fractious Senate as 
it seeks to eliminate most aspects of the former govern-
ment’s approach to this issue.
However, as detailed in The Economics of Climate Change, CEDA’s latest report, 
regardless of arguments about the how and why, if Australia does not respond 
with a scientific, evidence-based, appropriately funded policy, the economic con-
sequences may be devastating.
Two examples illustrate this succinctly. 
The first relates to the consequences of increasing extreme weather events and 
the economic and social impact that these events have on Australia’s production 
capacity. 
Roma in Queensland has endured several significant floods in recent years. If a 
levee to protect the town had been built in 2005, it would have cost $20 million. 
However, since 2008 $100 million has been paid out in insurance claims and 
since 2005 a repair bill of over $500 million has been incurred by the public and 
private sectors.
Foreword
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This is but one example, and statistics highlighted in this publication show that 
the number of catastrophic weather events is increasing. The economic losses 
associated with these events are also trending up. 
These statistics clearly indicate that introducing risk assessment and mitigation 
strategies is a sensible, practical and cost-effective approach to management. It 
is argued for these reasons the Federal Government should introduce a national 
risk register that includes strategies to manage risks of adverse climate events 
both in the public and private sector.
The second example of not recognising the economic consequences of climate 
change and appropriate responses relates to capital investment in Australian 
industries. Australia is reliant on accessing foreign capital for major projects. 
However, changes in policy may mean changes to international capital flow and 
investment decision making which could have consequences for nationally signifi-
cant industries in Australia and associated asset values.
Applying climate related risk assessments when considering investment and 
financing decisions is an emerging trend globally. Concerns about environmental 
and economic risks associated with carbon intensive investments have already 
directly influenced the strategies of major international lending institutions. 
Australia needs to ensure it keeps in step with international developments on this 
front and importantly has the options available to move to less carbon intensive 
industries and energy sources.
What energy sources will be the cheapest and cleanest in the future will be 
dependent on supply and the technological breakthroughs that are aimed at a 
cleaner but economically sustainable future. This is why Australia should develop 
robust regulatory regimes for all energy sources, including nuclear, along with 
ensuring they have a social licence to operate.
It naturally follows that we must also be investing in research and development to 
drive these technological breakthroughs to occur.
Australia cannot avert climate change in isolation but it has both a responsibility 
as a developed nation and an economic imperative to respond with the rest of 
the world. A prudent government and industry more generally would be wise to 
recognise this.
I would like to thank the contributing authors and CEDA advisory group for 
their work in making this publication possible and hope you find it any insightful 
resource.
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin 
Chief Executive 
CEDA
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
6
The politics of climate change are highly contested in Australia at this point in 
time. In The Economics of Climate Change CEDA explores the economic issues 
of climate change examining the international context, how to minimise Australia’s 
exposure to climate change risks and how best to expend its natural resources. In 
the international context, the report examines both the emerging policy responses 
and their economic consequences for Australia. 
Adjusting to the impacts of climate change and mitigating its effects will be a 
task for both this and future generations. As a relatively small industrialised nation, 
Australia must be open and responsive to global developments in both the eco-
nomic and the policy environment. Many of the implications of climate change 
can be ameliorated through effective policy responses, whereas poor public 
policy will exacerbate the challenges. These issues were explored in CEDA’s 
recent publications on population, A Greater Australia: Population, policies and 
governance; water, The Australian Water Project; and energy, Australia’s Energy 
Options. This policy perspective suggests that there is considerable scope to 
improve Australia’s policy response to climate change. 
CEDA has also extensively examined the policy settings surrounding climate 
change in the 2009 report Climate change: Getting it right, the 2010 report, A 
taxing debate: Climate policy beyond Copenhagen and the 2012 policy perspec-
tive A taxing debate: The forgotten issues of climate policy.
Executive  
summary
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The contributions to this policy perspective accept the science of climate change 
but acknowledges that there are uncertainties about its ramifications both at the 
global and, particularly, the local level. They also appreciate Australia’s inability to 
avert global climate change in isolation while appreciating the nation’s economic 
need to respond in conjunction with the rest of the world, particularly the devel-
oped world. It also appreciates that climate change is a source of economic and 
social challenge but also of opportunity.
Contributions and acknowledgements
This report includes three contributions on the economics of climate change and 
makes a series of recommendations for how Australia should respond. 
In The global economic environment and climate change, Martijn Wilder AM out-
lines how Australia’s response to climate change fits within the global context and 
identifies potential challenges for the nation’s economic activity. He also identifies 
how emerging trends in capital flows have the potential to significantly influence 
the value of assets owned by Australian industry. These trends have the potential 
to fundamentally reshape a number of nationally significant industries and the 
nation needs an appropriate policy response to encourage economic diversity. 
In Climate risks: Probabilities, consequences and actions, Professors Quentin 
Grafton and Rodney J Keenan describe how Australia is already suffering from 
climate events, chiefly weather related at this point. These events have been 
increasing over time. They also explain how a probability-consequence risk 
framework provides a useful way to describe climate risk and indicates how to 
respond domestically. In particular, these frameworks are valuable for minimising 
the social and economic consequences of climate change. 
In Effective action: Identifying Australia’s best options to mitigate climate change, 
Nathan Taylor elaborates on past CEDA research to articulate a methodology for 
assessing Australia’s potential climate mitigation options. This approach explicitly 
deals with the uncertainties involved in responding to climate change, particularly 
the technical uncertainty and the social cost of responding. 
CEDA wishes to acknowledge the input and expert advice from this project’s 
advisory group in developing the final reform recommendations endorsed by 
CEDA. The CEDA Advisory Group consisted of: 
•	 Professor Warwick McKibbin, Chair in Public Policy and Australian National 
University Public Policy Fellow; and
•	 Professor Ross Garnaut, AO, University of Melbourne.
These experts provided guidance and input into the final recommendations of 
the report. However, the final report is entirely the responsibility of the individual 
authors. 
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The global economic environment and climate 
change
Irrespective of a failure to develop a global consensus response to climate 
change, it would be inappropriate for Australian businesses to assume that the 
international response will have no influence over their activities. In addition to the 
physical reality of climate change, increasingly onerous regulatory regimes across 
many counties are attempting to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile 
changes in international capital flows and investment decision making, the emer-
gence of disruptive technologies and the inter-relationship of all those factors 
means that no business is immune from the economic impacts of climate change. 
This is particularly so for those Australian businesses in the emissions intensive or 
fossil fuel sectors and those competing internationally.
Governments around the world are develop-
ing law and policy to directly address climate 
change. This includes laws to require emitters 
of greenhouse gas emissions to cap, reduce or 
eliminate those emissions or introducing poli-
cies to encourage renewable energy or energy 
efficiency measures that will change business-
as-usual behaviour. The emerging global 
network of regulatory limits to control and regu-
late emissions now covers most major emitters. 
The consequence for Australian businesses of 
international policy developments include: 
•	 Changes in demand by our traditional customers for Australian fossil fuels and 
commodities;
•	 A direct impact on asset values and certain assets becoming stranded; 
•	 Overseas investments becoming regulated; and
•	 The emergence in other countries of disruptive technologies which may drive 
greater competiveness in our trading partners.
The world is now seeing national governments directly implement a suite of 
domestic measures to regulate global greenhouse emissions. While the full intro-
duction of these measures will take time there is already a focus on how such 
national and regional schemes can be globally integrated outside of an interna-
tional global agreement. Investors and the owners of businesses have to consider 
the rate at which this will occur and emissions will become a permanent cost 
of production. This includes consideration of various carbon price scenarios that 
may result in stranded assets – those that would become unprofitable under 
certain carbon regulatory scenarios resulting in considerable reductions in the 
long-term value of particular companies.
These issues are being considered by investors. Concerns with environmental 
and economic risks associated with carbon intensive investments have already 
directly influenced the strategies of major international lending institutions. There 
“ Concerns with environmental and economic risks 
associated with carbon intensive investments 
have already directly influenced the strategies 
of major international lending institutions. There 
is an emerging trend to apply climate change 
related risk assessments when considering 
important investment and financing decisions.”
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is an emerging trend to apply climate change related risk assessments when con-
sidering important investment and financing decisions. A disinvestment and shift 
from financing is not simply based on a philosophical opposition to carbon inten-
sive activities, but is often based on a hard analysis that the demand in markets 
for such industries or their commodities is diminishing and at risk.
Notwithstanding the challenges, climate change can present new opportunities 
to industry and business. These include relocating farming systems to more 
desirable locations as a result of warming, such as viticulture in Tasmania, and 
also innovation in new technologies and systems, such as renewable energy and 
storage, that respond to changing social, environmental and commercial condi-
tions. Australian industry needs to be open to these opportunities. Furthermore, 
Australia has considerable experience in dealing with climatic vagaries. This 
experience can be a source of benefit to the nation and the world: CEDA’s The 
Australian Water Project found that: 
Australia’s water management policies enabled it to do something that no other 
country could conceivably have managed…a 70 per cent reduction in water avail-
ability had very little aggregate economic impact. This represents an achievement of 
global significance as human communities across the world respond to a changing 
climate.1 
While not all of these impacts may occur immediately, disruptions are already 
evident and the trends are clear. Australia’s carbon intensive industries need to 
plan for a very different future economic environment and Australian industry as a 
whole must be open to emerging international efforts aimed at addressing climate 
change. 
Managing domestic risks 
Climate change poses a number of substantive physical risks for the world. 
Possible adverse consequences include threats to unique and threatened eco-
systems and cultures, extreme weather events such as heat waves and coastal 
flooding, and large-scale singular events such as large and irreversible sea level 
rises in response to increases in global mean temperature. The consequences of 
these changes are likely to be unevenly distributed. 
In Australia, the key projected consequences of climate change include: tem-
perature increases with more hot days and fewer cool days; a rise in extreme 
fire-weather days in southern Australia; an increase in the incidence of droughts 
in southern Australia and an increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones among 
others. According to data compiled on weather related losses for insurers over 
the past few decades: 
•	 The number of catastrophic weather events is getting larger; and 
•	 The economic losses associated with weather related events is trending 
upwards over time.
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Australia is already suffering from the influence of adverse climate events.
Australia requires a framework for assessing climate risks and considering pos-
sible actions that may lower them. Adaptive actions are inevitably geographically 
specific, focused at local to regional scales and require actions by individuals, 
communities, businesses and government.
An assessment of climate risks and vulnerabilities requires planning that connects 
the probabilities of future climate events to the abilities of people and places 
impacted by the event to recover. It should also examine what actions could be 
undertaken to reduce the consequences of 
events if they should occur. Governments by 
themselves cannot, and should not, undertake 
all the actions adaptation to climate change 
requires. However, they are key to leveraging 
resources across the private sector and to 
developing the social networks that underpin 
resilience to extreme climatic events. 
Appreciating the nature of the risks facing 
regions can help reduce the consequences 
of climate risks. For instance, had a levee to 
protect the town of Roma in Queensland from 
flooding been built in 2005, it would have cost 
$20 million. Since the levee was not built, $100 
million has been paid out in insurance claims since 2008 and a repair bill of over 
$500 million incurred by the public and private sector since 2005. 
To address and assist in minimising climate change risks: 
•	 The existing overview of climate risks facing Australia should be expanded 
to include a national risk register in a similar fashion to the United Kingdom’s 
National Security Risk Assessment; and
•	 The national risk register should also examine strategies, for both the public 
and private sectors, to manage risks that account for both the probability and 
consequence of adverse climate events. 
Effective action 
The changes necessary to avert climate change will be difficult and expensive, 
but particularly so for Australia which is a relatively unusual industrialised energy 
exporter. If Australia is to make the necessary adjustments, and preserve the 
wellbeing of its citizens, it needs to spend its national resources effectively. Yet 
Australia’s overall policy response to climate change has not been suitable for the 
challenge. What has been absent from the policy debate has been a contextu-
alisation of individual policy approaches within a wider framework that allows for 
comparison of policy efficacy. 
“ Appreciating the nature of the risks facing regions 
can help reduce the consequences of climate risks. 
For instance, had a levee to protect the town of 
Roma in Queensland from flooding been built in 
2005, it would have cost $20 million. Since the 
levee was not built, $100 million has been paid 
out in insurance claims since 2008 and a repair 
bill of over $500 million incurred by the public and 
private sector since 2005.”
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One approach that specifically deals with the uncertainty involved, and that 
provides an objective basis for comparing different policies, is to consider that 
Australia has a portfolio of possible responses to climate change. These potential 
responses represent the ability, but not the obligation, to undertake singly or in 
combination any of a range of actions currently and in the future if the conditions 
emerge that makes them appropriate. These possible actions are in substance 
options – real options. 
Adopting a real options investment approach to Australia’s response to climate 
change would provide a transparent and objective basis for comparing the costs 
and benefits of different policy approaches and enable the nation to maximise the 
net benefits (gross benefits less costs) of its actions. 
To implement this approach to addressing climate change, the Federal 
Government should: 
•	 Regularly update the Australian Energy Technology Assessment (AETA); 
•	 Assign probabilities to these forecasts and identify the technological break-
throughs that would underpin reduced future levelised costs of energy 
assessments; 
•	 Forecast the future costs over time for greenhouse gas emissions to determine 
the net present value (NPV) of alternative low greenhouse gas emissions tech-
nologies; and
•	 Use a real options investment approach to maximise the potential greenhouse 
gas emissions that Australia can efficiently mitigate.
To maximise the value of Australia’s option portfolio, the Emissions Reduction 
Fund should focus on energy efficiency improvements, given their relative cost to 
deliver emission reductions, to meet Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets 
while also using the insights of the options 
analysis to spend funds on means to maximise 
emissions reductions over the longer term. 
Key examples of ways in which the potential 
for low greenhouse gas emissions could be 
encouraged include: 
•	 Focusing research and development on enabling specific technology break-
throughs, such as those identified as necessary for geothermal power to reduce 
its parasitic load (energy required internally to run a plant); 
•	 Developing robust regulatory regimes for all energy sources prior to their deploy-
ment, including nuclear power;
•	 Working to ensure a social licence to operate exists for all energy sources, 
including nuclear power and wind generation; 
•	 Integrating low greenhouse gas emissions energy sources with the transmission 
and distribution system; and
•	 Developing domestic skills in implementing the initial investments in emerging 
technologies. 
“ To maximise the value of Australia’s option portfolio, 
the Emissions Reduction Fund should focus on energy 
efficiency improvements, given their relative cost 
to deliver emission reductions, to meet Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets…”
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This approach would not be technologically neutral. Instead it would focus on 
trying to capture as much of the potential positive NPV of each low greenhouse 
gas emission technology. While this may result in greenhouse gas emissions 
being marginally higher in the short term, Australia would be spending funds to 
maximise their long-term reduction. 
Endnotes
1 Briscoe, J., 2011, The Australian Water Project, Crisis and opportunity: Lessons of Australian water reform, Volume 1, page 12.
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This chapter examines what is happening globally with 
climate change policy in both the public and private 
sectors and how this may change financing and 
investment decisions both internationally and here in 
Australia. 
1.  The global economic 
environment and climate 
change
 Martijn Wilder AM
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Martijn Wilder is head of Baker and mcKenzie’s global 
Environmental markets practice. he is also Chairman of low Carbon 
australia, a Board member of the Clean Energy finance Corporation, 
Chair of the nsW Climate Change Council, on the governing board of 
the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP),  
a Committee member of the australian initiative for sustainable aviation fuels and a Director 
of WWf and the Climate Council. he holds academic positions as a Professor of Climate 
Change law at the australian national University and an affiliate, Cambridge Centre for 
Climate Change mitigation Research, Department of land Economy, University of 
Cambridge. 
Introduction
Since 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
UNFCCC) has been the basis upon which countries have sought to cooperate 
to pursue international political and legal commitments to reduce rising levels of 
global greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is also a process that is politically 
complex and as a result has been unable as yet to deliver a long-term global 
agreement to implement binding limits on greenhouse emissions, with countries 
refusing to adopt real measures in the absence of other countries doing the 
same. It is clearly perceived by many governments and the business interests 
within those economies that limiting emissions growth will directly limit economic 
growth and place them at a competitive disadvantage.
In the Australian context, this has long been the view with industry ensuring 
adequate protection under the Clean Energy Act 2012 through free permits and 
compensation payments and more recently as demonstrated by the growing 
business support for repeal of the Clean Energy Act with no alternative regulatory 
cap to limit greenhouse gas emissions from industry.
However, for any Australian business to consider that the failure to date of the 
UNFCCC to deliver a binding global agreement on climate change or the removal 
of any domestic regulation to restrict greenhouse gas emissions, allows them to 
operate in a business as usual scenario, is naive. 
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The physical reality of climate change impacts, the increasing introduction of 
regulatory regimes across many countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions, 
changes in international capital flows and investment decision-making, the 
emergence of disruptive technologies and the inter-relationship of all those 
factors means that no business is immune from the economic impacts of climate 
change and investors that consider climate change risk. This is particularly so 
for Australian business in the emissions intensive or fossil fuel sectors and those 
which compete internationally.
The direct impacts of climate change on 
business 
In October 2006, Sir Nicholas Stern made clear that climate change will have 
a major economic impact, equivalent to losing at least “five per cent of global 
gross domestic product (GDP) each year, now and forever” in a business as usual 
emissions scenario.1 The Stern Review describes how climate change creates 
the risk of “major disruption to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to 
those associated with the great wars” and how “it will be difficult or impossible to 
reverse these changes”.2 
The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) released in September last year reinforced the cause of such damage, 
stating that the warming of the climate system is “unequivocal” and “adaptation 
and mitigation choices in the near-term will affect the risks of climate change 
throughout the 21st century”. It identified in specific detail the more localised 
impacts of climate change on many areas around the world, building on and 
complementing the significant research that is already taking place.3 Such analy-
sis also builds upon the actual impacts that have for some time been witnessed 
over the last few years in terms of the physical impacts that climate change is 
already causing. For investors and owners of business this provides a clear basis 
for making investment decisions. 
The physical effects of climate change are far-reaching and include sea-level 
rise, ocean acidification, change in rainfall patterns and increased disaster risk 
as weather events (including storms and droughts) increase in frequency and 
intensity.4 Further, extreme weather events caused by climate change, may lead 
to additional bushfires,5 while heavy rainfall and cyclones may lead to flooding.6 
Such events have far-reaching flow-on effects for Australian and international 
business.
For example, the 2011 floods in Queensland not only had an impact on insur-
ance earnings,7 but also reduced production for some miners8 and forced up 
global coal prices, which had flow-on effects for companies relying on cheap 
coal for profitability.9 The insurance and mining industries factor in big climate 
events such as flooding in their respective decision-making processes. While it 
is not necessarily suggested that these particular floods occurred as a result of 
climate change, science indicates that due to climate change, events like these 
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will become more frequent and so, climate events are likely to have a greater 
effect on these industries. Other examples include changing rainfall patterns alter-
ing agriculture yields and the ability of hydroelectric power stations to generate 
electricity, which again has flow-on effects for certain asset classes.
This may directly affect investments by impacting on the value of assets. The 
Mercer Report on the implications of climate change on investments10 predicts 
that the cumulative economic cost of climate change impacts (with respect to 
the physical environment, health and food security) may be up to $3.7 trillion to 
2030.11 In particular, health impacts and population migration risks are said to be 
underrated, as there is presently not sufficient evidence to draw sound conclu-
sions on these impacts.12 
In recent years, the high cost of increasingly frequent and severe weather events 
has made global headlines. In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused wide-
spread damage in New York City, crippling electricity infrastructure and leaving 
downtown Manhattan without power for four days. It is estimated that the record 
14 foot storm surge alone cost the utility Con Edison $500 million and New York 
businesses $6 billion.13 In 2011, widespread floods struck Thailand, closing down 
an important auto parts supply chain and reducing car production by hundreds 
of thousands of vehicles, costing Toyota alone $1.5 billion in lost earnings.14 More 
recently, the United Kingdom has seen devastating floods for the third time since 
2007 with British Prime Minister David Cameron attributing this increased fre-
quency of “abnormal weather events” to climate change.15 
The impact of climate change on 
the infrastructure underpinning 
developed economies is par-
ticularly significant. A report by the 
Climate Institute found that most 
infrastructure owners were focused 
on maintaining their assets to stan-
dards based on historic, not future 
climate.16 In Australia alone, there 
are 35,000 km of coastal road 
and rail worth $60 billion at risk of 
sea level rise and storm surges as 
the result of climate change.17 A report published by the Victorian Government 
has found that “[t]he water, power, telecommunications, transport and building 
sectors are all at significant risk from climate change impacts” by 2030 (in the 
worst case scenario) or 2070 (in the best case scenario).18 
A failure of major public infrastructure has follow-on costs for the broader 
economy, affecting supply chains and the ability to get products to market. The 
insurance industry and governments must also fund the cost of reconstruction, 
with associated increases in premiums and taxes. 
Increasingly we see the experience of the physical climate change impacts and 
predictions of future scenarios resulting in:
“ The impact of climate change on the infrastructure underpinning 
developed economies is particularly significant…
“ A failure of major public infrastructure has follow-on costs 
for the broader economy, affecting supply chains and the 
ability to get products to market. The insurance industry and 
governments must also fund the cost of reconstruction, with 
associated increases in premiums and taxes.”
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
17
•	 A re-evaluation of existing business practices and business risks by both busi-
nesses themselves and investors; and 
•	 The adoption of business practices that make them more completive in the 
short to medium term ( for example energy and water efficiency or alternative 
supply chains) and more likely to exist as viable investment in the longer term.
This changing behaviour has been seen across a variety of industries and coun-
tries. In the United States, Apple is protecting itself from future energy price 
shocks with data centres and new manufacturing facilities that run on 100 per 
cent renewable energy.19 Nike has adapted its processes in light of increasing 
water scarcity by building a manufacturing facil-
ity that eliminates the use of water and process 
chemicals in fabric dyeing. While in Europe, 
British Telecom is planning its infrastructure 
spending on the basis of flooding scenarios 50 
to 100 years in the future.20 
In comparison to much of the rest of the world, 
Australia is a long way behind. According to 
the Climate Institute, “the proportion of organ-
isations reporting that they had carried out a 
vulnerability assessment for climate impacts fell 
from a majority (nearly 60 per cent) in 2008 to 
less than half (47 per cent) two years later, and 
those that had taken action or made plans for 
adaptation in response to the findings of the 
vulnerability assessments were even fewer – just over a third.”21 Sectors of the 
Australian economy found to be “underprepared” included electricity, road and 
rail, and financial services.22
The fragmented and inconsistent political response to climate change is likely 
a contributing factor to the inaction and attitude of Australian businesses. 
Since 2007, the Australian Government has put forward three different legisla-
tive regimes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the current intention is 
to remove any cap on industry emissions altogether. Moreover, there remains no 
central agency responsible for adaptation, with management of climate change 
risk primarily left to local councils. Major policy reviews intending to map out 
Australia’s economic development, including the Energy White Paper, Agricultural 
Competiveness White Paper and the more recent Productivity Commission 
inquiry into Public Infrastructure, make no mention of climate change or its asso-
ciated risks. 
The investment required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prepare for 
the impacts of climate change is often capital intensive and requires appropriate 
policy certainty and incentives. The lack of bipartisan approach to climate change 
mitigation and the fragmented approach to adapting to its impacts is not condu-
cive to the economic transformation required to bring Australia back up to pace 
with the rest of the world. 
“ The investment required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and prepare for the impacts of climate 
change is often capital intensive and requires 
appropriate policy certainty and incentives. The 
lack of bipartisan approach to climate change 
mitigation and the fragmented approach to adapting 
to its impacts is not conducive to the economic 
transformation required to bring Australia back up to 
pace with the rest of the world.”
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The emerging global regulatory and policy 
framework
In Australia there is now a clear intent at the political and business level to ensure 
that any regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by Australian industry be 
removed. The Business Council of Australia, the Australian Industry Group and 
the Minerals Council of Australia have all been vocal proponents of the imme-
diate repeal of the Clean Energy Act.23 The Australian Petroleum Production & 
Exploration Association has gone further and called for the “removal of any 
greenhouse gas abatement requirements that may be imposed as part of envi-
ronmental approval processes”.24 
The current government has for some considerable time, both now and while in 
opposition, argued that Australia should not adopt any emissions regulation while 
other countries fail to do the same. The argument as it goes, is that Australia’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) under the Clean Energy Act places it well ahead 
of other countries and as such places Australian industry at a clear competitive 
disadvantage. The European Union (EU) ETS is constantly criticised as a failed 
framework and China is brushed aside as a scheme that will never take real 
effect. It is a view that has been supported by many business leaders but ignores 
the reality and carries with it real risks.25 
Such thinking is out of step with current global developments and is based on 
the falsehood that Australia has been acting alone. To the contrary, with growing 
concern over rising levels of greenhouse gases around the world, governments 
are developing law and policy to directly address climate change. This includes 
laws to require emitters of greenhouse gas emissions to cap, reduce or eliminate 
those emissions (for example putting a price on carbon emissions) or introducing 
subsidies, measures or policies in areas, such as renewable energy or energy 
efficiency, which will change business-as-usual behaviour. The emerging global 
network of regulatory limits to control and regulate emissions now covers most 
major emitters. Figure 1 below shows the current stage of development of carbon 
pricing regimes around the world.
For any business or investor, law and policy developments represent major risks 
for Australian business due to:
•	 Changes in demand by our traditional customers for Australian fossil fuels and 
commodities;
•	 Linked direct impacts on asset values and certain assets becoming stranded; 
•	 Overseas investments becoming regulated through a cost on carbon (which the 
Mercer Report estimates could increase by up to $8 trillion from 2010 to 2030 
depending upon the policy approach taken); and
•	 The emergence in other countries of disruptive technologies and an acceler-
ated uptake in alternative technologies, as is being seen with renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, all of which drive greater competiveness in our trading 
partners.
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For Australian companies operating overseas this again has a direct cost to their 
businesses that must be factored in. It is made all the more complex where law 
and policy developments are in a state of flux. Key Australian industries such 
as coal mining and oil and gas cannot escape the effect that these regulatory 
regimes have on demand and regulation of fossil fuels in major export consumers. 
While Europe has had an ETS in place since 2005, China and the US are now 
progressing quickly. In addition, our other trading partners are also developing 
long-term climate policies. For example the world’s eighth largest emitter, the 
Republic of Korea has passed laws to implement an economy wide emissions 
trading scheme in 2015. The scheme is part of the broader Korean National 
Strategy for Low Carbon, Green Growth which has the stated aim of transition-
ing the Korean economy from a carbon intensive industrial base towards green 
technology and investment. As part of the current five year plan, implemented in 
2009, Korea committed two per cent of GDP to create a knowledge and techno-
logical foundation to sustain a green growth economy.26 
The world’s largest emitter China is pursuing an aggressive approach to invest-
ment in and support for renewable energy and the implementation of provincial 
and regional emissions trading schemes, driven by a genuine and immediate 
desire to manage increasing levels of pollution and their severe and detrimental 
health impacts, the need to manage energy prices and to ultimately maintain 
political stability.
Figure 1 
CountriEs With CArbon priCing MEChAnisMs (iMplEMEntED AnD sChEDulED)
source: Ecofys, presentation on international Carbon markets, Carbon Expo Barcelona, 2013
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The six (and soon to be seven) provincial and regional emissions trading schemes 
now cover an estimated one billion metric tons of carbon dioxide, making the 
evolving market second only to the EU ETS in size.27 In its next five year plan, to 
be released in 2015, China is expected to lay out plans for a national ETS, which 
would create the world’s largest carbon market. 
A key objective in China’s climate change policy is to become a world leader in 
renewable energy. Renewable energy targets in the latest five year plan called 
for 160 GW of new installed wind capacity by 2020. In 2012, the initial 5 GW 
solar target was revised upwards twice, with a new target of 40 GW by 2020 set 
by the Chinese government.28 In 2013, wind power generation increased more 
than coal generation and passed nuclear power output for the first time.29 These 
ambitious policy settings have resulted in China becoming the world’s largest 
renewable energy manufacturer and single largest investment destination in less 
than a decade.30 
The government has previously announced its commitment to spending approxi-
mately $15 billion over the next decade to boost electric car development.31 This 
follows a 2010 commitment to boosting the number of electric-powered vehicles 
by 20 million by 2020. China’s influential National Development and Reform 
Commission has said that it is looking to subsidise the cost of at least four million 
electric-powered vehicles and that the government is already trialling their use in 
the country’s main cities, including Beijing and Shanghai.
These measures will have wide-ranging impacts, changing global demand for 
fossils fuels and driving the emergence of new and disruptive technologies. The 
point is made clear by Jim O’Neil in his book The Growth Map: 
“ Western critics may point to China’s polluted cities and rivers and call the country’s 
growth unsustainable, but China’s leaders see exactly the same problems, feel them 
even more acutely that these distant critics, and are busily seeking solutions. 
  By 2020, China plans to have reduced its carbon intensity by between 40 per 
cent and 45 per cent compared with 2005 levels. Writing in the Financial Times in 
November 2009, Sir Gordon Conway, co-chair of the China Council for International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), described China’s plan 
for a low-carbon economy. ‘The Chinese leaders are moved by a sense of urgency,’ 
he wrote. ‘Following the traditional economic model is not an option: resource, 
social and environmental constraints make it impossible. They are also aware of the 
danger that rapid growth will lock China into industrial and urban structures that will 
become a liability in a low-carbon world.’ …
  The key to cutting emissions, wrote Conway, was ‘decoupling growth from green-
house gas emissions’. This would mean reducing energy consumption per unit of 
GDP by 75–85 per cent by 2050, through a comprehensive efficiency scheme, 
involving everything from low-carbon cities and transport systems to revamped 
factories. Fossil fuels would be used more efficiently, use of renewables and nuclear 
energy would expand, and carbon-heavy emissions would be captured before they 
polluted the environment. Not only do the Chinese see this plan as a means to 
cleaner air and water, and less dependence on fluctuating fossil fuel prices, but they 
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also see it as a way for China to develop a competitive advantage in a low-carbon 
world. The ambition and detail of this policy far outstrip anything we have seen from 
the United States.
  Applying the impact of China’s low-carbon measures to predictions for China’s oil 
consumption in 2050 is fascinating. If China were to succeed in supplying 50 per 
cent of its new energy needs with renewable resources by 2030, and 100 per cent 
by 2050, as the CCICED reports it hopes to, then this would have a dramatic effect 
on our projections for global oil demand. In 2004 we predicted that the world would 
be using 75.2 million barrels of oil per day by 2050. Assuming the Chinese do what 
they intend, then that estimate is 20 per cent too high. The world in 2050 will be 
using just 60 million barrels of oil per day. If India were to commit to similar targets, 
that would slash a further 20 million barrels per day from our 2004 projection for oil 
consumption by 2050.”
More recently, more direct measures have been taken to tackle emissions, includ-
ing measures to limit coal to 65 per cent of primary domestic energy consumption 
by 2015 and banning new coal generation in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.32 
These measures all directly impact demand from the largest importer of Australian 
coal and therefore the value of major mining and export infrastructure assets 
across Australia. 
Finally, the world’s second largest 
emitter, the US, has again been identified 
by many Australian politicians and busi-
nesses as supportive of an Australian 
approach of taking little action. The 
reality is at the federal level, President 
Barack Obama is using his powers 
under the Clean Air Act and through 
the Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) to circumvent a hostile Congress 
to implement emissions standards on 
new coal fired power stations, which 
will effectively prevent the construc-
tion of new coal power stations without carbon capture storage technology.33 In 
addition, the EPA has implemented national emission standards on coal power 
stations that require them to reduce emissions of mercury and other hazardous 
air pollutants. The effect of these regulations and other air pollution measures 
introduced by the Obama administration is projected to lead to 60 GW of coal-
fired generation being retired by 2020.34 
The US also has a number of state based and regional emission trading schemes 
currently in operation. The Californian ETS commenced operation in 2013 and 
follows the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative launched among north-eastern 
states in 2009 and in 2007 the Western Climate Initiative among a number of 
US states and Canadian provinces. Just this month, the Governor of Washington 
State unveiled a carbon reduction plan that would include a cap-and-trade 
scheme.35 
“ More recently, more direct measures have been taken to 
tackle emissions (in China), including measures to limit coal 
to 65 per cent of primary domestic energy consumption by 
2015 and banning new coal generation in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. These measures all directly impact demand 
from the largest importer of Australian coal and therefore 
the value of major mining and export infrastructure assets 
across Australia.” 
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The world is now seeing national governments directly implement a suite of 
domestic measures to regulate global greenhouse emissions. While the full intro-
duction of these measures will take time there is already a focus on how such 
national and regional schemes can be globally integrated outside of an interna-
tional global agreement. Investors and owners of businesses have to consider the 
rate at which this will occur and emissions will become a permanent cost of pro-
duction. This includes consideration of various carbon price scenarios that may 
result in stranded assets – those that would become unprofitable under certain 
carbon regulatory scenarios resulting in considerable reductions in the long-term 
value of particular companies.
International capital flows 
While the physical effects of climate change as well as increased regulation will 
have a clear impact on Australian investments, the third critical factor at play is 
the rapidly changing landscape with respect to international capital flows. 
Traditionally, investors and financiers simply have not taken climate change risk 
into account in their decision-making. There are a number of reasons for this. 
Climate change occurs over decades and many investors have much shorter 
investment timeframes. In addition, the lack of climate change related reporting 
by companies has made it difficult for investors to evaluate risk. Finally, political 
uncertainty and the lack of a stable carbon market also make it difficult for inves-
tors to price in a regulatory carbon price.36 
However, there is increasing momentum to more carefully assess investments in 
carbon intensive industries or divest altogether and in last 12 months there have 
been some significant developments.
The Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Angel Gurría has called for the “complete elimination of 
emissions to the atmosphere from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels in the second half of 
the century”. In supporting the need for 
drastic action, Mr Gurría made reference to 
the immense cost associated with extreme 
weather events such as Hurricane Sandy 
(0.5 per cent of US GDP in 2011) and made 
the point that unlike the financial crises, we 
do not have “a climate bailout option”.37 
Recently, the head of the International 
Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, in 
response to what she termed “the merciless march of climate change”, called 
on governments to phase out energy subsidies and spur investment in low-
carbon technologies of the future.38 At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Ms 
Lagarde called for a new kind of economic growth that included putting a price 
on carbon.39
“ Traditionally, investors and financiers simply have 
not taken climate change risk into account in their 
decision making…
“ However, there is increasing momentum to more 
carefully assess investments in carbon intensive 
industries or divest altogether and in last 12 months 
there have been some significant developments.”
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Concerns with environmental and economic risks associated with carbon inten-
sive investments have directly influenced the strategies of major international 
lending institutions. At this year’s World Economic Forum, the President of the 
World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, publically supported divestment from carbon inten-
sive assets and put pressure on 
pension funds “to recognise their 
fiduciary responsibility to future 
pension holders who will be affected 
by decisions made today”.40 The 
World Bank has modified its energy 
lending strategy to limit financing of 
coal-fired power plants to “rare cir-
cumstances” and only in countries 
that have “no feasible alternative”.41 
The world’s largest public financial 
institution, the European Investment 
Bank, has also implemented restric-
tions on financing for new fossil fuel projects, including applying an Emissions 
Performance Standard to all new funding proposals.42 At the end of last year, the 
US Export-Import Bank approved similar investment guidelines for coal power 
projects and coal mines. This is backed by revised “coal guidelines” released by 
the US Treasury, which require the US to use its votes in international lending 
institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
to block funding for coal projects that aren’t fitted with carbon capture storage 
technology.43 
Even in institutions that continue to fund fossil fuel projects, closer scrutiny of 
environmental effects and risks are being imposed. The ADB safeguard principles 
require that project proposals take into account environmental impacts including 
transboundary emissions. The ADB itself is under increasing pressure to change 
its financing of coal plants. 
Such activity is not limited to international institutions. Increasingly international 
pension funds are also heading in this direction. Pension funds, with more than 
US$30 trillion under management, have the ability to significantly change invest-
ment flows, especially as they can afford to take a long term view. In response 
to the recent attempts by Ian Dunlop to raise attention on BHP’s approach to 
managing climate risk by running for a position on the BHP Board, the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) stated: “We want the industry 
to take action, and this is an opportunity to have that agenda taken into the heart 
of the debate in the boardroom by someone who understands the severity and 
potential impacts of this risk.”44 
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund, which grew by $200 billion in 2013 alone 
and owns about one per cent of all global stocks, exited its investments in 27 
gold and coal mines in 2013 and cut its stakes in others.45 The wider sector 
review potentially heralds one of the biggest changes since it was set up as a 
sovereign wealth fund in 1998. It is also examining whether the fund should quit 
oil, gas and coal firms over their environmental impact. 
“ Even in institutions that continue to fund fossil fuel projects, 
closer scrutiny of environmental effects and risks are being 
imposed…
“ Such activity is not limited to international institutions. 
Increasingly international pension funds are also heading in this 
direction. Pension funds, with more than US$30 trillion under 
management, have the ability to significantly change investment 
flows, especially as they can afford to take a long term view.”
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Interestingly, some Australian superfunds are starting to follow suit. The Asset 
Owners Disclosure Project (AODP) rates the world’s biggest funds on their 
management of climate risk. Currently, Australian funds make up six of the top 
10 highest rating funds.46 In April this year, UniSuper announced that it plans to 
exclude fossil fuel companies from its socially responsible investment options.47 
At the same time, the Chief Executive Officer of QSuper, Rosemary Vilgan, has 
recognised that discussions around stranded assets are “getting traction in the 
investment community”.48 Colonial First State Global Asset Management, which 
is owned by the Commonwealth Bank, has established a task group to examine 
how it should respond to the prospect of stranded assets as a result of climate 
risk.49 Finally, AMP has just announced that  its responsible funds would have 
limited scope to invest in mining and 
energy companies. This fund represents 
about $3 billion and about two per cent 
of all funds under management by AMP.
Divestment from carbon intensive 
investments is being seen across all 
sectors of the investment community. 
Early this year, 17 of the world’s largest 
philanthropic foundations announced 
commitments to withdraw funds from 
investments in fossil fuel companies and 
reinvest in the clean energy sector.50 The Divest-Invest coalition includes almost 
20 funds which manage a total of approximately $2 billion. In addition, a number 
of the major US university endowment funds are following suit.
There is significant pressure being placed on international and Australian funds 
in this regard. Groups such as the Investor Group on Climate Change, the AODP 
and the Carbon Tracker Initiative, are publicising the enormous potential declines 
in the valuations of fossil fuel companies that will occur once capital markets rec-
ognise the staggering investment risks associated with climate change. Carbon 
Tracker has calculated that, if we are to keep temperature increases to no more 
than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels as the world’s governments 
have agreed, then most of the world’s remaining fossil fuel reserves cannot be 
extracted. This will force a major downward market correction in the value of, for 
example, Xstrata (coal), Exxon (oil and gas), and British Gas (gas) – and in the 
total funds under management by pension funds who hold these shares. Even 
in the absence today of a single country with a robust carbon price in place, the 
market is doing its job and beginning to take notice of these enormous risks.51 
Not all companies agree with the Carbon Tracker and stranded asset argu-
ment. Exxon Mobil Corporation in early April acknowledged that climate change 
poses a risk to the company’s bottom line, but it made clear it would not chart 
a future without fossil fuels. In a recent letter to its shareholders52, Shell, while 
acknowledging that risks from climate change will “continue to rise up the public 
and political agenda”, expressed confidence that none of its current reserves will 
become stranded. Rather, the company said: “The world will continue to need oil 
“ Divestment from carbon intensive investments is being 
seen across all sectors of the investment community. 
Early this year, 17 of the world’s largest philanthropic 
foundations announced commitments to withdraw funds 
from investments in fossil fuel companies and reinvest in 
the clean energy sector.”
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and gas for many decades to come, supporting both demand and oil and gas 
prices.” Moreover, Shell said, the notion of oil and gas companies risking billions 
of dollars in potential stranded assets due to climate regulation has “significant 
gaps”, including its failure to acknowledge the significant projected growth in 
energy demand; the role of carbon capture and storage technologies; and the rise 
of natural gas, bioenergy and energy efficiency measures. It stated that: “Energy 
demand growth, in our view, will lead to fossil fuels continuing to play a major role 
in the energy system – accounting for 40-60 per cent of energy supply in 2050 
and beyond.” However, Shell did acknowledge the increasing risk from regulatory 
regimes and the need for a fundamental transition in the energy system.
Changes are also increasingly occurring in the financing sector. As investment 
banks and retail banks sign up to international principles such as Principles for 
Responsible Investing53 they are increasingly held to account against such prin-
ciples by community advocates and non-government organisations (NGOs). As a 
result, they are increasingly moving away from financing certain carbon intensive 
activities or activities with adverse environmental or community outcomes. In this 
regard, Deutsche Bank’s recent refusal to finance the expansion of the Abbot 
Point Coal Facility is indicative of the pressure being placed on such institutions. 
For Australian business this ultimately makes obtaining financing not only more 
difficult but more expensive resulting in delays and cost overruns for projects.
It is important to also recognise that such disinvestment and shift from financing 
is not simply based on an increasing philosophical opposition to carbon intensive 
activities, but is often based on a hard analysis that the demand in markets for 
such industries or their commodities is diminishing and at risk. 
We are also witnessing a significant growth in investment alternatives. For 
example, the Mercer Report predicts that additional cumulative investment in 
energy improvements, renewable energy, biofuels, nuclear energy and carbon 
capture and storage could expand by more than $5 trillion to 2030.54 
The global bond market with a total valuation of US$90 trillion is witnessing 
significant movement into climate smart investments. A recent report produced 
by the Climate Bonds Initiative and commissioned by HSBC estimates that this 
new asset class has approximately US$350 billion in the pipeline.55 The size of 
the issuances range from US$100 million to US$2.5 billion and are almost all 
highly oversubscribed by investors. Interestingly, this emerging green bond asset 
class is not being driven by a sudden interest in managing the enormous risks 
of climate change nor any other environmental constraint.56 It is strictly the result 
of pure market forces where demand for risk-adjusted returns is no longer being 
met by the traditional asset classes. As Molitor notes, what might happen when 
the growth of this market-driven new asset class intersects with the capital mar-
ket’s recognition of the staggering climate change risks as put forward by the 
Carbon Tracker Initiative?57 A tipping point is now clearly visible.
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Fossil fuels and renewables
It is now clear that the trends around regulating emissions and international capital 
flows, combined with the more general regulation of the environmental impacts of 
fossil fuels, will have and is having a direct impact on the cost competitiveness of 
fossil fuels. Leading European broking house Kepler Chereux has predicted that 
the global fossil fuel industry faces a $30 trillion loss in revenues over the next two 
decades if the world takes action to address climate change and decarbonise the 
global energy system.58 For example, lower demand profiles for coal in the US, 
Europe and China has resulted in a steady stream of downgrades to long-term 
coal price forecasts.59 As described above, major drivers in this lower demand 
profile are pollution reduction measures and a rapid uptake of renewable energy 
among the world’s largest coal consumers. 
As noted above it is clear that renewables are 
now reaching a point of disruption and will in 
many parts of the world displace coal and gas 
power stations. Global investment banking giant 
Citigroup has called this the start of the “age of 
renewables”, claiming that renewable energy 
is becoming increasingly cost competitive with 
natural gas peaking and baseload plants.61 The 
key metric used in the Citi report is the levalised 
cost of energy, which looks at the average cost 
of producing a unit of electricity over the lifetime 
of the generating source. The Citi report is based on modelling a long-term gas 
price forecast of $5.50 in the US. With long-term gas prices predicted to be 
double that in Australia, the cost competitiveness of renewables increases signifi-
cantly.60 Unlike natural gas and coal, the input for renewable energy is not subject 
to the volatility of global energy markets and with renewable costs continuing to 
decline, renewable generation represents a safer long-term investment. 
When combined, the increasing regulatory limits on carbon intensive industries 
and incentives for renewables, these investment trends and capital flows will 
increasingly assist renewable energy and other disruptive technologies to become 
more cost competitive and displace some key carbon intensive industries or 
at least impact on their role within the global economy. For example renewable 
energy combined with future long-term battery storage will directly challenge the 
commercial viability of the traditional power station and the transmission/distri-
bution network business model. It is interesting to note that over the past few 
years, The Economist recently reported that electric power companies in Europe 
have lost €500 billion in market value both because of declining renewable energy 
costs and their over-investment in fossil fuel generation assets.62 
How quickly, and to what extent, fossil fuels are affected remains to be seen. 
While there is no suggestion that fossil fuels will not continue to be the major 
source of global energy in the short term, over the medium and longer term the 
changes to the fossil fuel sector will be dramatic.
“ …the global bond market with a total valuation 
of US$90 trillion is witnessing significant 
movement into climate smart investments. A 
recent report produced by the Climate Bonds 
Initiative and commissioned by HSBC estimates 
that this new asset class has approximately 
US$350 billion in the pipeline.” 
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Conclusion
Australian business and Australian investors operate in a global business environ-
ment. While our current political and business leaders pursue an approach of not 
regulating the greenhouse emissions of Australian industry, the global economy 
is rapidly moving in the opposite direction. The physical reality of climate change 
impacts, the increasing introduction of regulatory regimes across many counties 
to limit greenhouse gas emissions, changes in international capital flows and 
investment decision-making, the emergence of disruptive technologies and the 
inter-relationship of all these factors means that no business is immune from 
the economic impacts driven by climate change. While not all of these impacts 
may occur immediately, disruptions are already evident and the trends are clear. 
Australia’s carbon intensive industries need to plan for a very different future eco-
nomic environment.
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This chapter presents a framework for assessing 
climate risks and considering possible actions that 
may lower climate risks.
2.  Climate risks: Probabilities, 
consequences and actions 
 Professor Quentin Grafton  
 Professor Rodney J Keenan
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“Almost all regions of the world have suffered extreme weather events in recent 
years…Despite protection measures, vulnerability has not been reduced in general. 
Climatic changes are discernible in most areas and already certain in some. Hence, 
the consequences of weather events are on the rise throughout the world, and the 
risks associated with them are changing faster and faster.”1
Introduction
Climate risks are bio-physical, chiefly weather related, events that occur as part of 
the current climate, have a probability or a likelihood of occurrence, and impose 
a negative cost or adverse consequences on current and/or future generations. 
These risks have always been with us, with the frequency, intensity and impact 
of climate related events varying with natural variation in the climate system. 
Climate risks are being magnified by changes in climate change due to emissions 
of greenhouse gases from burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and industrial 
processes. 
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At a global scale the possible adverse consequences of climate change include 
threats to unique and threatened ecosystems and cultures, extreme weather 
events (such as heat waves, extreme precipitation and coastal flooding) and 
large-scale singular events (such as large and irreversible sea-level rise) in 
response to increases in global mean temperature.2 These projected effects 
are likely to be unevenly distributed with larger impacts for the disadvantaged, 
to have global impacts on the world economy, and to contribute to extensive 
biodiversity loss. In Australia, the key projected consequences of climate change 
include: temperature increases with more hot days and fewer cool days; a rise 
in extreme fire-weather days in southern Australia; an increase in the incidence 
of droughts in southern Australia; sea-level rise; an increase in the intensity of 
tropical cyclones; and a greater intensity and frequency of extreme daily rainfall.3 
Risk is commonly defined as the probability of an adverse event ‘multiplied’ by 
the consequence, or the expected value of the adverse event. A common risk 
assessment framework assumes there can be a trade-off between the probability 
of an event and its consequence. This implies that a high probability event that 
has a low consequence (PH–CL) is commensurable with a low probability event 
with a high consequence (PL–CH), as shown in Figure 1. The slope of the risk 
curve represents the hypothetical willingness to trade-off a lower probability with 
a higher consequence where the steeper the slope, the smaller the willingness to 
trade-off a decline in probability for a higher consequence. 
Using the climate risk framework identified in Figure 1, climate change can 
be visualised as a shift outwards in the risk trade-off curve from R1 to R2 such 
that for a given probability of an adverse event the consequence is greater, or 
Figure 1 
probAbility AnD ConsEQuEnCEs of CliMAtE risKs
source: grafton, RQ 2010, adaptation to climate change in marine capture fisheries’, Marine Policy, vol. 34, p. 607.
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for a given adverse consequence, the probability of the event is greater. As the 
impacts of climate change are projected to increase with higher average global 
mean temperatures, it is possible the shape of the risk trade-off will change as 
the willingness to substitute between probability and consequence may decline 
the higher the global mean temperature.
Risk identification, as presented in Figure 1, presents the first step in a risk 
assessment and management framework. Figure 2 illustrates the seven other 
steps in a circular process undertaken by most of the more than 100 of the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 firms interviewed by the Wharton School in relation to 
catastrophic risks.4 The risk analysis and management steps include: 
•	 Risk identification; 
•	 Prioritisation of risks; 
•	 A risk assessment; 
•	 Identification of risk management options; 
•	 Design of a risk management strategy; 
•	 Design of a crisis management strategy; 
•	 Implementation; and 
•	 Monitoring of progress and updates to the strategy. 
Figure 2 
CirCulAr risK AnAlysis AnD MAnAgEMEnt proCEss 
source: Kunreuther, h, michel-Kerjan, E and Useem, m 2013, Corporate strategies for managing Catastrophic Risks in the s&P 500: linking 
initiative and Deliberative Thinking, Wharton school, University of Pennsylvania, accessed at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/
CorpstrategiesformanagingCatRisksinP500_WhartonRiskCtr_2013nov.pdf, 28 april 2014. p. 7
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3. Undertake 
risk assessment
4. Identify risk 
management options
5. Design risk 
management strategy
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management strategy
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The vast majority of firms undertake assessments of catastrophic risk on an 
annual or more frequent basis, and more than 75 per cent of interviewed firms 
noted the importance of risk identifica-
tion and prioritisation to their businesses.
We present a framework for assessing 
climate risks and considering possible 
actions that may lower climate risks. Our 
focus is on actions to reduce the con-
sequences of climate change or what is 
commonly referred to as climate adapta-
tion. Adaptation does not substitute for 
mitigation (reduced probability of climate 
change). Both sets of actions may reduce climate risks with mitigation reduc-
ing the potential future magnitude of climate change and adaptation reducing 
the adverse effects of that change. While mitigation measures are best handled 
through national policies, adaptation is context and geographically specific, 
necessarily focused at local to regional scales that involve actions by individuals, 
communities, businesses and government. 
Uncertainty and climate probabilities 
Uncertainty poses a dilemma as to what actions should be undertaken today 
in the absence of certainty about the future consequences of climate change. 
However, uncertainty does not imply that possible actions to reduce the conse-
quences of climate change should be postponed until the certainty is resolved. 
Indeed, the greater the uncertainty, all else equal, the more important it becomes 
to: 
•	 Create options and flexible pathways in the future should the consequences of 
climate change prove to be large and negative; and 
•	 Avoid ‘lock in’ in terms of climate action or irreversible investments as actions 
are, typically, sequential and may need to change as additional information 
comes available. 
Two key features of climate change uncertainty are: 
1: The probability and consequence of the events are uncertain; and 
2:  The probability of extreme warming and also the probability of extreme conse-
quences of extreme warming are both subject to ‘fat-tailed distributions’5. 
Fat-tailed probability distributions share the characteristic that both the mean 
and median have a higher value than the mode, as illustrated in Figure 3. A key 
implication with a fat-tailed distribution is that the probability of an extreme or a 
high impact event can be much higher than with a normal distribution with the 
same modal value. For instance, fat-tailed distributions mean that the probability 
of an increase in global mean temperature in excess of seven degrees Celsius 
“ Uncertainty poses a dilemma as to what actions should 
be undertaken today in the absence of certainty about 
the future consequences of climate change. However, 
uncertainty does not imply that possible actions to reduce 
the consequences of climate change should be postponed 
until the certainty is resolved.”
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is as high as five per cent6 based on multiple probability distributions of climate 
sensitivity (increase in global mean temperature from a doubling in pre-industrial 
levels of carbon dioxide). Fat tails may also arise from positive feedbacks with 
climate change such as methane emissions from peat land in northern latitudes.7 
The implication of fat-tailed probability distributions for both climate sensitivity and 
positive feedbacks with climate change is that they can greatly alter the economic 
calculus of possible damage, and the benefits versus the costs of mitigation. 
For example, assuming a higher damage function whereby damages are much 
greater at higher temperatures, and using fat-tailed rather than a thin-tailed distri-
bution for climate sensitivity, can increase the projected consumption losses due 
to climate change by a factor of more than 1008. 
Climate consequences 
Debates about an appropriate climate damage function and the probability dis-
tributions of climate sensitivity mask the fact there are already some quantitative 
data about the adverse consequences of current weather events with the present 
climate. Two outstanding features of the data compiled to date on weather related 
losses for insurers over the past few decades are: 
•	 The number of catastrophic weather events is getting larger; and 
•	 The economic losses associated with weather related events is trending 
upwards over time, and for some events such as severe thunderstorm events, 
this loss increase occurs even after accounting for the rise in destructible values 
over time.9 
Figure 3 
hypothEtiCAl fAt-tAilED probAbility Distribution 
source: adapted from Calel, R, stainsforth, Da and Dietz, s 2013, Tall tales and fat tails: the science and economics of extreme warming, 
Climatic Change Doi 10.1007/s10584-013-0911-4. figure2(b)
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Figures 4a shows the global number of weather related catastrophes from 1980-
2012 while Figure 4b shows the total losses (insured and uninsured) from these 
events. Both of these figures, sourced from data compiled by the world’s largest 
reinsurer, Munich RE10, show an increasing trend and that the rate of change 
(slope) is increasing over time. A trend of an increasing number of weather related 
Figure 4a 
nuMbEr of globAl WEAthEr rElAtED CAtAstrophEs 1980–2012 
sourced from data at muchener Ruckversicherungs-gesellschaft, geo Risk Research, natCatsERViCE, January 2013.
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Figure 4B 
globAl WEAthEr rElAtED CAtAstrophEs EConoMiC lossEs ($us billion) 
1980–2012 
sourced from data at muchener Ruckversicherungs-gesellschaft, geo Risk Research, natCatsERViCE, January 2013.
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catastrophes is true for Australia11 and is consistent with climate change model 
projections12. An increasing trend in weather related catastrophes also exists for 
countries in East Asia13 that includes some of Australia’s nearest neighbours. 
A review of data on weather catastrophes reveals that: 
•	 Not all the events are storm or precipitation related events; and 
•	 Property damages are not necessarily required to cause fatalities. 
For instance, in 2013, the third largest global weather related event recorded 
in terms of fatalities was the July heatwave in the United Kingdom. This was 
estimated to have caused 760 fatalities, but resulted in no recorded property 
losses.14 The point is that actions intended to reduce the consequences of 
climate risks should include responses to immediate and regional/local events 
(such as a cyclone) as well as events that may occur at a national level and over a 
protracted period of time (such as a widespread drought).
Climate risks and vulnerabilities
The probability and the consequences of climate change events determine 
climate risks. To what extent climate risks are realised depends on multiple 
factors that include: exposure to climate events, sensitivity of bio-physical and 
socio-economic systems to these exposures, and human actions.
Exposure is determined by the climate system and the location of assets or com-
munities in relation to climate events. It is influenced by greenhouse gases (GHG) 
concentrations in the atmosphere along with other climate drivers. There are 
three ways to reduce future climate risk exposure: 
1:  Reduce current and future GHG concentrations by limiting emissions and/or by 
undertaking GHG sequestration; 
2:  Relocate people and assets from relatively more exposed to less exposed 
locations; or 
3: Undertake geo-engineering such as enhancing the earth’s albedo effect.15 
Sensitivity is the responsiveness of the community, industry or physical or natural 
assets to different climate related events for a given level of exposure. This 
includes the capacity to resist the impacts of climate events and the resilience 
of bio-physical and socio-economic systems to ‘bounce back’ or recover from 
a given level of exposure. Sensitivity can be reduced by investments and actions 
that make systems more resilient. 
Climate risk exposure and sensitivity combined determine the potential con-
sequences of climate events. What ultimately are the consequences of future 
climate related events is determined by actions to reduce exposure (such as 
through relocation) and/or sensitivity (such as through increased climate resil-
ience). These inter-relationships are illustrated in Figure 5 whereby both exposure 
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and sensitivity determine potential climate consequences. Actions that dimin-
ish sensitivities and exposure may reduce the actual consequences or climate 
vulnerabilities. The action arrows in Figure 5 illustrate the multiple pathways to 
reduce the potential climate consequences for a given global mean temperature. 
The residual exposure and sensitivity after actions have been implemented deter-
mine climate vulnerability.
An assessment of climate risks and vulnerabilities requires planning processes 
that connect the probabilities of future climate events to the abilities of bio-physi-
cal/socio-economic systems to recover, and to the possible actions or pathways 
to reduce the consequences of the events should they occur. This involves 
multiple processes and evaluations. A valuable first step is the establishment of 
national or state risk registers that provide a quantitative index of relative con-
sequences and relative probability in both the short and long run. This allows a 
comparative assessment of all risks (such as earthquakes and terrorist attacks), 
not just climate related risks, in a transparent process to inform decision-makers 
about how to allocate scarce resources to reduce exposure and/or sensitivities at 
a national and regional scale. 
The United Kingdom (UK) National Security Risk Assessment16 is an example of 
risk identification process undertaken at a national level. Its risk assessment is 
on a biennial cycle and a 20 year planning horizon that is intended to identify 
national security risks and support a National Security Strategy. While far short 
of a national risk register, the Australian government has prepared an overview 
of both current and future climate risks facing Australia denominated by water, 
agriculture, infrastructure, natural ecosystems, human health, and coasts17.
Figure 5 
CliMAtE ConsEQuEnCEs AnD vulnErAbilitiEs: ExposurEs, sEnsitivitiEs AnD 
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Climate adaptation actions 
Actions to reduce sensitivities and exposure are commonly referred to as climate 
adaptation. They can be responsive – implemented after an adverse climate 
event to reduce impact or assist recovery – or anticipatory – undertaken before 
an event occurs to prepare for or avoid impacts.18 Whether ex-ante or ex-post, 
adaptation to climate change should be dynamic and respond, when necessary, 
to updates in evidence and understanding. 
Actions can be incremental in that they aim to maintain an existing piece of 
infrastructure, an industry or a community by ‘adding on’ to actions already in 
place to manage climate risks. Alternatively, anticipated climate events with a high 
consequences and/or at a widespread spatial scale may require collectively and 
explicitly planned transformational actions that result in new types of industries, 
infrastructure or communities in new locations.19 
A debate exists about the need for investment of public funds for adaptation. 
Some20 have argued that there is only a limited requirement for public investment 
beyond the need to provide and disseminate information on possible conse-
quences and advice on appropriate actions. In this view, the role of government 
in adaptation is primarily to promote a diverse and resilient economy and well-
functioning markets for risk management tools, such as insurance. 
An alternative perspective is that 
adaptation requires the establish-
ment of incentives, standards and 
regulations that promote appro-
priate individual and community 
actions to climate risks, such as 
building standards or land zoning 
rules; institutional changes, such as 
development of effective planning, 
national strategic assessments and 
increased emergency preparedness and responses to climate change events. 
Actions may also include public assistance to help the private sector manage 
large-scale catastrophes, improved public investment decisions in relation to 
public infrastructure, and the provision of public goods provided or regulated by 
governments, such as roads and natural or cultural heritage areas.21 
Assessing the costs and benefits of public adaptation actions can be approached 
by a comprehensive framework for assessment of ‘total climate risk’22 based on: 
•	 An assessment of the expected annual losses to the economy from existing 
climate patterns;
•	 Projection of the extent to which future economic growth will put greater value 
at risk; 
•	 An assessment of the incremental loss that could occur over a 20 year period 
under a range of climate change scenarios based on the latest scientific knowl-
edge; and 
“ Governments by themselves cannot, and should not, 
undertake all transformation adaptation actions, but are key 
to leveraging resources across the private sector and civil 
society and are fundamental to the development of across 
society networks and the development of public-private-civil 
society partnerships  to improve resilience.”
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•	 An evaluation using risk-based cost-benefit analysis of a selection of feasible and 
applicable measures to adapt to the expected risk – spanning infrastructural, 
technological, behavioural and financial solutions and including environmental 
and non-market values23.
Such assessments are required to avoid public actions that contribute to malad-
aptation that make bio-physical/socio-economic systems less resilient to climate 
events. 
Anticipating and managing the effects of climate related events as part of public 
actions can reduce the overall costs to government, industry and the community 
in the long run (see Figure 6) by both speeding up the recovery time and lower-
ing the consequences of climate related events24. Governments by themselves 
cannot, and should not, undertake all transformation adaptation actions, but are 
key to leveraging resources across the private sector and civil society and are 
fundamental to the development of across society networks and the develop-
ment of public-private-civil society partnerships to improve resilience25. While 
lowering future costs is desirable, in general, it is not efficient to reduce future 
climate related losses to zero. This is because when determining what actions 
should be undertaken, private or public, the marginal costs of adaptation actions 
must be considered against the expected benefits from these actions26. 
Figure 6 
thE CAsE for invEsting in rEsiliEnCE AnD ADAptAtion 
source: WEf 2011. a vision for managing natural disaster risk: proposals for public-private stakeholder solutions. World Economic forum, 
geneva. accessed at http://www.weforum.org/reports/vision-managing-natural-disaster-risk 23 april 2014. p. 57
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Assessment of the costs of climate related 
events
Key challenges when assessing the case for investment in adaptation is to under-
stand what are the costs of climate related events, and how these might increase 
under a changing climate. Important data sources of climate risks are weather 
related disaster cost estimates. In many countries, including Australia, these are 
largely drawn from insurance data.27 While valuable, insurance payout-based 
assessments only account for insured losses, and these represent only a fraction 
of the total cost of a weather related disaster. For instance, they do not include 
many indirect costs, the loss of life, or intangibles such as damage to ecosystem 
services or cultural sites and are, typically, limited to those hazards and assets 
that are actually subject to insurance.
To assess the full economic effects of climate change is challenging and resource 
intensive. Three broad approaches to assess impacts, according to Keating and 
Handmer28, include:
•	 General equilibrium analysis;
•	 Partial equilibrium analysis; and
•	 Integrated assessments.
General equilibrium analysis provides a top down approach to economy-wide 
impacts using computer models based on multiple-sectors of the economy. This 
approach is useful to assess complex flow-on or indirect impacts to an economy 
and provides insights into impacts on multiple markets or sectors. Partial 
equilibrium analysis has the benefit of utilising various and flexible valuation meth-
odologies that can be applied to a variety of impacts, sectors or markets and is 
well suited to exploring the impacts of extreme events. Integrated assessments 
include analysis of specific sectoral circumstances as well as the flow-on and 
feedback effects within the economy as a whole. Socio-economic projections 
and qualitative decision-support tools can also be incorporated within integrated 
assessments. 
Key issues associated with the economic assessment of climate change impacts 
include: 
•	 The valuation of impacts on intangibles (such as the environment or amenity 
values); 
•	 The selection of an appropriate discount rate; 
•	 The inclusion of uncertainty; 
•	 The analysis of low probability but high impact events; and 
•	 Assessment of distributional impacts between different parts of the community. 
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Assessment of adaptation actions
Adaptation actions can take a variety of forms, including ‘hard’ options such as 
investment in infrastructure or technology or ‘soft’ actions that involve changes in 
policy settings, and support for behavioural change or financial solutions. 
Infrastructure or technology investments
To manage climate risks for hard infrastructure or technology investments the 
timing of investment, and the payoffs or costs from delaying these projects, 
are important. Waiting to invest in a project means planners can improve their 
ability to learn about likely payoffs in a situation where these payoffs are initially 
imperfectly known. Delaying investments may also have a positive value where 
investments are irreversible and there is a positive option value from improved 
information in the future29. 
There is an inherent trade-off between the enhanced flexibility from delaying a 
large project and the potential benefits from early implementation. For instance, 
society is generally risk-averse when it comes to basic needs, such as water 
security. Consequently, it may be desirable when meeting basic needs to under-
take early implementation to protect these needs regardless of the irreversibility of 
investments. Pre-planning or modular design options may also improve outcomes 
where there is risk and irreversibility, because they can reduce the costs of waiting 
and speed up implementation time when the decision is made to invest. Modular 
design options, for instance, allow for 
smaller initial infrastructure investments 
to be built and then be scaled up, as 
required, depending on updates in 
information and understanding. 
An example of good practice in the 
assessment of the costs and benefits 
of adaptation is the Port Phillip Bay 
Coastal Adaptation Pathways Project 
in Victoria. This project developed an 
applied research framework to identify 
adaptation pathways, summarised in 
Table 1, to support coastal adaptation planning in urbanised areas in response to 
changing inundation risks under climate change due to a combination of increas-
ing sea level and catchment flooding30. This framework was used to assess 
economically feasible adaptation pathways to help manage inundation risk over 
time. The planning process combined forecasts of inundation hazards, economic 
analysis and community involvement. Action options were then compared based 
on net present value while Monte Carlo analysis was used to consider uncer-
tainty in inputs (i.e. distributions between upper and lower estimates of future 
inundation). 
“ Pre-planning or modular design options may also improve 
outcomes where there is risk and irreversibility, because they 
can reduce the costs of waiting and speed up implementation 
time when the decision is made to invest. Modular design 
options, for instance, allow for smaller initial infrastructure 
investments to be built and then be scaled up, as required, 
depending on updates in information and understanding.”
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Policy Physical/engineered Research Behavioural
new or extended flood 
overlays to inform land 
use planning
Upgrade of local 
drainage assets
Develop climate 
resilient design 
standards for 
developments and 
assets in flood prone 
areas
increased training to 
enhance organisational 
capacity to prepare for 
and respond to flood 
events
new or extended 
special building 
overlays
increase height or 
extent of current flood 
levees
Undertake erosion 
assessments
Community awareness 
and education 
campaigns to increase 
resilience to flood 
events
Update state and 
municipal emergency 
management plans
Upstream retarding 
basins to improve flood 
storage capacity
Detailed risk 
assessments to 
determine risk of flood 
protection failure
Targeted information 
resources for flood 
protection measures 
for builders and 
renovators
incorporate changing 
inundation risks into 
corporate risk registers
floodgates for creeks 
and rivers
Technical feasibility 
studies for proposed 
flood protection 
measures
increased maintenance 
of key assets such as 
stormwater drains
Rezoning of land 
subject to inundation
modify stormwater 
diversions and 
storages
Review insurance 
arrangements
mandatory disclosure 
of flood risk at time of 
purchase and leasing
Restore natural 
floodplains and 
swamps
Clarify roles and 
responsibilities for 
flood mitigation, 
response and recovery
Update drainage asset 
management plans
Elevate critical assets 
above the flood level
incorporate 
consideration of 
inundation issues 
in relevant planning 
checklists
Relocate critical assets
Review heritage 
policies to minimise 
potential barriers 
to flood protection 
measures
source: aECom/maV 2012. adapting to inundation in Urbanised areas: supporting Decision makers in a Changing Climate. accessed 
at http://www.abm.org.au/adaptationproject/about.html on 23 april 201
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Role of the business sector
Industry
Adaptation has not been a priority for business and industry with the exception 
of a few sectors more exposed or sensitive to climate change, such as tourism 
and primary industries31. Nevertheless, an awareness of how climate change 
may affect businesses is growing. For instance, the World Economic Forum has 
identified the failure to adapt to climate change as a key global risk.32 Many large 
companies and those investing in assets with a long service life also consider 
future climate risks and their actions include 
responses to events that directly affect their 
operations. However, what is lacking is a 
need to consider wider system implications 
and to develop a more anticipatory approach 
to investment in adaptation.
Notwithstanding the costs, climate change 
can present new opportunities to industry 
and business. These include relocating 
farming systems to more desirable locations 
as a result of warming, such as viticulture in Tasmania, and also innovation in new 
technologies and systems, such as renewable energy and storage, that respond 
to changing social, environmental and commercial conditions. 
Climate risks to industry include the effects of increasing maximum daily tempera-
tures on productivity.33 For example, in Victoria the annual total days of extreme 
heat have increased faster than expected. Since 1996, the total days above 35°C 
have been at the level previously estimated for 2030. The difficulty is that heat 
stress in employees poses a significant risk to those businesses with workers 
outdoors, such as construction, heavy industry and defence. Extreme heat can 
also increase the rate of equipment failure and maintenance costs on essential 
infrastructure such as electricity (brownouts, reduced conductivity), communica-
tions (infrastructure failure) and rail (buckling tracks) and can have negative health 
impacts for employees and employers. 
Identified needs for adaptation in industry include accessible and sector-specific 
adaptation information and networks that enable knowledge exchange within 
and between organisations; planning support to enable better preparedness 
and recovery from climate events; and appropriate finance-related products 
to support businesses to prepare and recover from climate related events.34 
Ultimately, investment in adaptation measures is a business decision and indus-
tries require frameworks to assess the business case for investment based on 
tangible (monetary) and intangible (non-monetary) benefits and costs. 
Policy Physical/engineered Research Behavioural
new or extended flood 
overlays to inform land 
use planning
Upgrade of local 
drainage assets
Develop climate 
resilient design 
standards for 
developments and 
assets in flood prone 
areas
increased training to 
enhance organisational 
capacity to prepare for 
and respond to flood 
events
new or extended 
special building 
overlays
increase height or 
extent of current flood 
levees
Undertake erosion 
assessments
Community awareness 
and education 
campaigns to increase 
resilience to flood 
events
Update state and 
municipal emergency 
management plans
Upstream retarding 
basins to improve flood 
storage capacity
Detailed risk 
assessments to 
determine risk of flood 
protection failure
Targeted information 
resources for flood 
protection measures 
for builders and 
renovators
incorporate changing 
inundation risks into 
corporate risk registers
floodgates for creeks 
and rivers
Technical feasibility 
studies for proposed 
flood protection 
measures
increased maintenance 
of key assets such as 
stormwater drains
Rezoning of land 
subject to inundation
modify stormwater 
diversions and 
storages
Review insurance 
arrangements
mandatory disclosure 
of flood risk at time of 
purchase and leasing
Restore natural 
floodplains and 
swamps
Clarify roles and 
responsibilities for 
flood mitigation, 
response and recovery
Update drainage asset 
management plans
Elevate critical assets 
above the flood level
incorporate 
consideration of 
inundation issues 
in relevant planning 
checklists
Relocate critical assets
Review heritage 
policies to minimise 
potential barriers 
to flood protection 
measures
source: aECom/maV 2012. adapting to inundation in Urbanised areas: supporting Decision makers in a Changing Climate. accessed 
at http://www.abm.org.au/adaptationproject/about.html on 23 april 201
“ Ultimately, investment in adaptation measures is a 
business decision and industries require frameworks 
to assess the business case for investment based on 
tangible (monetary) and intangible (non-monetary) 
benefits and costs.”
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Finance 
The quality and availability of information is essential to the creation of an ade-
quate risk management strategy and in assisting the decision making process 
of governments, financial sector participants, businesses and individuals. 
Collaboration between ‘content creators’, information distributors and end users 
of information is necessary to improve the usability, granularity and accessibility of 
climate risk information. 
The financial sector currently plays an important role in providing information 
on the short-term risks associated with investment decisions through the price 
signals embedded in bank loans and insurance premiums.35 Nevertheless, these 
contracts are generally relatively short-term in nature and, therefore, fail to provide 
information on the potential long-term effects associated with climate change. An 
expanded role for the funds management and superannuation sectors is pos-
sible with the provision of additional information on long-term climate risks and 
also through their investment decisions based on environmental, governance and 
sustainability (ESG) factors. 
Sole reliance on the insurance sector to assume climate risks is becoming 
increasingly inadequate. While the cost of insurance sends a very important price 
signal for risk to the community or businesses, a holistic risk management strat-
egy that identifies potential risks and puts in place mitigation measures or deters 
risk taking behaviour is required to reduce the potential total cost associated with 
extreme events. For example, a levee to protect the town of Roma in Queensland 
from flooding would cost $20 million, compared with $100 million paid out in 
insurance claims since 2008 and a 
repair bill of over $500 million incurred 
by the public and private sector since 
2005.36 
In some cases there is a market failure 
or missing market that requires govern-
ment intervention. These interventions 
may include the establishment of the 
‘rules of the game’ that promote the 
development of new financial instruments, for example climate derivatives37, or 
national catastrophic insurance, such as in New Zealand with its Earthquake 
Commission, or supplementation of the private reinsurance market such as the 
Japanese Reinsurance Company. Such government interventions must be care-
fully designed to ensure that market price signals and indicators of risk are not 
skewed in ways that promote moral hazard or maladaptation. For instance, public 
actions that compensate asset owners for risky behaviour, such as building on 
regularly flooded locations, may create perverse incentives for individuals to 
assume excessive risk. 
“ …a levee to protect the town of Roma in Queensland 
from flooding would cost $20 million, compared with $100 
million paid out in insurance claims since 2008 and a 
repair bill of over $500 million incurred by the public and 
private sector since 2005.”
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Conclusions 
Climate risks have always existed, but with climate change and a growing 
global population expected to exceed more than 9 billion by 2050, the adverse 
consequences of climate related events are projected to increase. While the con-
sequences of some climate risks may not occur for decades, the number and 
the economic costs of weather related catastrophes are currently growing at an 
increasing rate globally, and in Australia.
Responding to climate risks requires a risk assessment and management frame-
work that registers the key risks and includes planning and strategies to manage 
these risks that account for both the probability and consequence of adverse 
climate events. Such a framework promotes the efficient allocation of scarce 
resources such that, for a given level of climate exposure, the adverse effects of 
climate change events can be reduced via actions (private and public) that dimin-
ish climate sensitivity. These adaptation actions include investments in both ‘hard’ 
infrastructure and also ‘soft’ approaches that alter policy settings and improve 
how institutions and systems respond to change. 
Adaptation actions, especially those that are required at a widespread spatial 
scale and for events with high negative consequences, require collective action 
and planning and public-private-civil society partnerships. In particular, high risk 
events demand effective and appropriate government action to correct for market 
failures or missing markets and to set the ‘rules of the game’. These interventions 
should encourage individuals, firms and communities to develop actions that 
can allow for win-win risk transfers, the correct pricing of risk, and also pathways 
for decision-makers to flexibly respond to updates in information, evidence and 
analysis. 
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This chapter examines current climate change 
mitigation policies and options for how Australia can 
strategically respond to climate change.
3.  Effective action: Identifying 
Australia’s best options to 
mitigate climate change 
 Nathan Taylor 
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Adjusting to the impacts of climate change and mitigating its effects will be a 
task for both this and future generations. As a relatively small industrialised nation, 
Australia must be open and responsive to global developments in both the 
economic and the policy environment. This paper sets out a framework for how 
Australia can strategically approach its response to climate change. 
The industrial revolution fundamentally altered the human condition. The average 
person living in a developed country now has more wealth, health and material 
wellbeing than all but an elite few from previous generations. But the planet too 
has been transformed. Geologists now refer to the past 200 hundred years as 
the Anthropocene, a period now indelibly marked into the record of the earth.1 
Unfortunately, the greenhouse gases emitted as a consequence of the Industrial 
Revolution are directly contributing to climate change that, if not checked and 
ultimately reversed, will have very adverse consequences for the quality of life 
of all living beings on earth. The challenge is to avert the worst consequences 
of climate change while maintaining the benefits of the material wealth that eco-
nomic development has generated. 
To prevent climate change becoming dramatic, and to limit the global risks asso-
ciated with it, will require major adjustments in human activity. These changes 
will be difficult and expensive, but particularly so for Australia which is relatively 
unusual in being both an industrialised country and a significant energy exporter. 
nathan taylor is the Chief Economist at CEDa where he is 
responsible for CEDa’s research and policy agenda. he has developed 
CEDa’s research programs on public policy setting, examined the 
issues associated with australia’s population, and developed reform 
agendas for australia’s macro economy and within the healthcare, 
energy and water sectors. 
nathan has also authored the papers Insuring Australia’s cities against drought, Urban water 
security; Water security: water for the farm and city, and Australia’s Energy Options: Policy 
choice not economic inevitability. 
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If Australia is to make the necessary adjustments, and protect the wellbeing of 
its citizens, it needs to spend its national resources effectively. Yet Australia has 
not reached a wide consensus on what should be the overall policy framework to 
respond to climate change. It remains a fiercely contested area of policy. It need 
not be. 
Australia’s Emissions Trading Scheme was a mechanism for engaging market 
forces in minimising the cost of adjusting to climate change while coordinating 
efforts with those of other countries. It also would have made explicit a market 
price associated with the costs to human society of greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, as implemented, it was insufficient to initiate the necessary transfor-
mation within Australia’s economy required to optimise the balance between 
the benefits and costs of tackling climate change.2 Significant market failures on 
the technology front inhibited the development of low greenhouse gas emission 
technologies, while structural aspects of the energy market discouraged their 
deployment. Additional policy responses would still have been necessary to 
achieve scenarios where climate change was kept to no more than two per cent 
Celsius of preindustrial levels. 
The alternative policy, the Emissions Reduction Fund, is an attempt to meet 
the current Federal Government’s commitment to a five per cent reduction in 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions of 2000 levels by 2020. The proposed 
methodology, of purchasing green-
house gas emission reductions via an 
auction process, has the potential to 
be costly while having limited effects. 
It need not be so. Properly executed, 
the Emissions Reduction Fund, in con-
junction with supplementary policies, 
could make a valuable contribution to 
Australia’s efforts at climate change 
mitigation. 
Policy uncertainty will hinder the 
changes that Australia undoubtedly 
needs to make, since it increases perceived risk attached to actions that individu-
als or organisations may take, and so increases the cost of change and reduces 
the amount of change achieved. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has stated that scenarios restricting global warming to two degrees 
Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels are: 
“ … characterised by more rapid improvements of energy efficiency, a tripling to nearly 
quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-carbon energy supply from renewables, 
nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or 
bioenergy by the year 2050.”3 
The energy supply mix identified by the IPCC is very different to what currently 
exists or is likely to exist without substantial investment in the energy sector. 
For instance, the scenarios whereby very adverse levels of climate change are 
avoided identify a major expansion in nuclear energy and widespread use of CCS 
“ The proposed methodology, of purchasing greenhouse 
gas emission reductions via an auction process, has the 
potential to be costly while having limited effects. It need 
not be so. Properly executed, the Emissions Reduction Fund, 
in conjunction with supplementary policies, could make a 
valuable contribution to Australia’s efforts at climate change 
mitigation.”
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but the current trend is for nuclear energy to contribute a declining share of the 
energy mix while CCS power stations are not currently commercially viable. It is 
strategically important for Australia that CCS technology be adopted, given the 
nation’s significant coal reserves. 
In addition to changes in the energy supply mix, there are widespread transfor-
mations required in transportation and land use patterns, building design and 
industrial and social use of energy more broadly. The costs of action are substan-
tial even if they are less than the costs of inaction.4 
What has been absent from the policy debate has been a contextualisation of 
individual policy approaches within a wider framework that allows for comparison 
of policy efficacy. Good public policy is not necessarily about getting the one right 
answer but it is about setting up a clearly defined framework with explicit goals 
and an explicit set of policy instruments, and a process within which policy inter-
ventions can be adjusted over time as conditions change and more information 
and experience accumulate. The Australian policy response to climate change is 
yet to fit this mould. 
One approach that specifically deals with the uncertainty involved, and that 
provides an objective basis for comparing different policies, is to consider that 
Australia has a portfolio of possible responses to climate change. These potential 
responses represent the ability, but not the obligation, to undertake singly or in 
combination, any of a range of actions currently and in the future if the conditions 
emerge that make them appropriate. These possible actions are in substance 
options – real options. Adopting a real options investment approach to Australia’s 
response to climate change would provide a transparent and objective basis for 
comparing the costs and benefits of different policy approaches and enable the 
nation to maximise the net benefits (gross benefits less costs) of its actions. 
This paper accepts the science of climate change but acknowledges that there 
are uncertainties about its ramifications both at the global and, particularly, the 
local level. It also appreciates Australia’s inability to avert global climate change in 
isolation and the fact that it is, in general, a technology taker. However, as a rich 
industrialised energy exporting country Australia has both an economic impera-
tive and an obligation as a good global citizen to play its part in responding to 
climate change. Australia, as a major producer and exporter of fossil fuels, has 
benefited substantially from the causes of climate change. 
Economically, Australia faces threats as the rest of the world responds. That 
requires Australia to respond also, and to recognise that Australia has expertise 
that can be leveraged, so that the nation ‘punches above its weight’ in respond-
ing to climate change. For instance, CEDA’s The Australian Water Project found 
that: 
Australia’s water management policies enabled it to do something that no other 
country could conceivable have managed … a 70 per cent reduction in water avail-
ability had very little aggregate economic impact. This represents an achievement of 
global significance as human communities across the world respond to a changing 
climate.5 
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A portfolio of potential responses
The basis of quantifying the uncertainty involved with adjusting to climate change 
involves viewing low greenhouse gas emission technologies and mitigation 
alternatives as representing call options for Australia. Owning a call option gives 
someone the right, but not the obligation, to purchase something in the future. 
Complex financial modelling methods have been developed to value options and 
a key factor in their pricing is the underlying uncertainty around whether it will be 
exercised. This makes them highly relevant when considering how to respond to 
climate change. The process of internalising the social cost of greenhouse gas 
emissions has yet to be settled at the national or global level while significant 
technological advances are required to enable competitive energy supply to 
be deployed. All these factors compound the uncertainty about the best policy 
response to climate change. 
Australia has the right to deploy more low greenhouse gas emission technology 
in the future if the levelised cost of such technology is less than a similar assess-
ment of existing technology when the cost to human society of greenhouse gas 
emissions is internalised. Quantifying the value of this portfolio of options is valu-
able when there are different strategies that can be developed to encourage their 
deployment. This approach helps address the question of whether the nation 
should effectively expend its limited resources. The value of Australia’s portfolio 
of low greenhouse gas emission technologies was exhaustively developed by 
the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) and 
elaborated on by Dr John Burgess in CEDA’s Renewables and efficiency policy 
perspective.6 
Conceptualising Australia’s response to climate change as optimising a portfolio 
of call options allows the application of a financial technique to a ‘real’, as distinct 
from a purely financial, investment, such as a project to commercially develop a 
piece of technology. A real option value can also be determined for the value of a 
choice to make a business or investment decision. It is a particularly useful tech-
nique to unlock the potential value involved in choices among options when there 
is considerable uncertainty around future conditions. It is designed to capture the 
value of any progressive resolution of future uncertainties as a project progresses 
and information accumulates, and of the associated flexibility of being able to 
wait, abandon, or expand on an investment opportunity as more knowledge 
of actual conditions is accumulated. A real options investment approach helps 
maximise the value of a portfolio of options. 
The value of Australia’s portfolio of low greenhouse gas emissions technologies 
can be estimated by:
•	 Examining the estimate of the future cost of energy from different technologies; 
and
•	 Assigning probabilities to these forecasts. 
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When combined with a projection of the cost to human society of greenhouse 
gas emissions, this approach allows the value of various technologies to be quan-
tified under different scenarios for technological progress. While these projections 
are complicated, the Australian Energy Technology Assessment (AETA) repre-
sents the best available current cost estimates for a number of energy generation 
technologies to 2050 and highlights how rapidly expected costs can change. 
Comparing the AETA projections with an earlier forecast of energy expectations 
conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) highlights how esti-
mates of the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) generated by different technologies 
can change rapidly due to global innovation or to the technical challenges associ-
ated with accessing the various forms of energy. 
Policies designed under current circumstances, but not taking into account the 
changing technological and operating environment, can be significantly wrong 
footed. Take for instance, policies designed to encourage photovoltaic panel (PV) 
installation in Australia. The budgetary costs of setting feed-in-tariffs designed to 
subsidise PV deployment blew out, and they were subsequently cut out or cut 
back in most jurisdictions as the global price fell dramatically. 
A better approach for the environment and for Australia as a whole, would have 
been to address any market failures that would prevent PV deployment when 
and where it does become commercially viable, and spend exactly the same 
amount as was spent in inefficiently subsidising outdated PV panels on research 
and development (R&D) activity instead. This approach assumes that Australia is 
too small a market to influence the global manufacturing supply of PV panels but 
acknowledges it can make a valuable contribution via R&D. Australia should do 
better at capitalising on its R&D, as CEDA has previously suggested.7 
Figure 1 
lEvElisED Cost of EnErgy in 2030
source: Estimates of the average lCoE are based on data from BREE (2012) and EPRi (2010)
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Assigning probabilities to the process of innovation and the technological 
breakthroughs necessary to reduce the costs of low greenhouse gas emission 
technologies is the next stage of quantifying its future value. While any forecast is 
limited in its accuracy, making assumptions explicit ensures a common basis for 
comparison between anticipated technological advances and provides an ability 
to compare public policy options. 
The ATSE study used a Monte Carlo method to create a distribution of invest-
ment profiles for Australia’s portfolio of low greenhouse gas emission technologies 
based on the EPRI technology cost estimates.8 Consider the case of solar thermal 
central towers which, it has been forecast, will see the LCOE shift significantly 
from approximately $200-$250/MWh to $80/MWh by 2020, if a range of tech-
nological breakthroughs occur.9 The technological advances required to achieve 
those cost reductions include: 
•	 Improving high temperature molten salt storage; 
•	 Reducing the parasitic power load; and
•	 Reducing capital expenditure and operations and maintenance costs among 
others. 
The technological advances identified in the roadmap essentially shift the antici-
pated probability distribution from that described in the initial ATSE report to 
another more attractive one – meaning that the technology is more likely to make 
a viable contribution to Australia’s efforts to mitigate climate change. If or when 
the required technological advances occur, the overall value of that technological 
option increases until such a time as it represents a positive investment for the 
nation. 
A more nuanced assessment of the probability of technological progress would 
attribute probability estimates to the different technological breakthroughs nec-
essary to make each low greenhouse gas emissions technology viable. Doing 
so would enable Australia to play a more strategic role in contributing to global 
climate change mitigation as it would allow for research and development funding 
that focused on the specific critical breakthroughs needed to make the tech-
nology viable. The nation’s abundance of renewable energy resources, wealth, 
and highly skilled workforce should enable Australia to make a disproportionate 
contribution to the commercial viability of low greenhouse gas emission technolo-
gies. That contribution will not occur by trying to encourage their deployment at 
this point in time via large subsidies, but by focusing resources on achieving the 
breakthroughs that will make them commercially viable in the foreseeable future. 
It also makes economic sense to then export that expertise to the rest of the 
world. 
The merit of adopting the ATSE approach is that if the net present value (NPV) of 
the distribution of future outcomes is positive at any stage there is the potential it 
will create wealth in the future and so can justify taking action now to capture that 
wealth. For example, action may take the form of reserving land for future gen-
eration capacity, as this initial action can be undertaken with less expense than 
the widespread (subsidised) deployment of the technology now. This may create 
value by making the technology available in the future on a commercial basis. 
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Australia’s wealth should be spent less on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
now and more on maximising the capacity to mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the future. This approach would involve spending the nation’s resources 
predominantly on capturing the positive NPV component of the probability dis-
tribution of future outcomes. Such an approach would ensure that the nation’s 
financial resources are wasted in an attempt to address climate change by costly 
means with limited effectiveness but instead to make sure that they are effectively 
deployed to make a real difference over time. 
Establishing the social licence to operate
According to the IPCC, global scenarios that avoid temperature increases greater 
than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels have much higher levels 
of all low greenhouse gas emission technologies than is currently the case. 
Unfortunately, in addition to technological challenges, significant social barriers 
also exist to the deployment of a range of effective technologies, particularly 
nuclear power. ATSE’s study found that nuclear power had one of the highest 
NPVs of all technologies.
The Federal Government’s Energy White Paper noted: 
Australia’s range of abundant low-cost energy resources has shaped our energy 
generation base around coal and gas. While other countries have adopted nuclear 
power as a way of diversifying their energy mix, Australia has not deployed the 
technology because it has never been economically competitive with fossil fuel tech-
nologies and because a community consensus on deployment is lacking.10 
Figure 2 
stylistiC probAbility Distribution of nEt prEsEnt vAluE (npv) for A 
tEChnology
source: This represents key concepts contributed by Dr John Burgess in CEDa’s Australia’s Energy Options: Renewables and efficiency 
policy perspective.
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However, the Energy White Paper noted that in “future circumstances” it may 
become viable, but that considerable social opposition exists. For this and other 
reasons, there would be lead times of 10 to 15 years prior to its potential deploy-
ment. Removing a viable option from the portfolio available to Australia is not in 
the nation’s interest. CEDA’s research has indicated that while nuclear power may 
not be commercially viable for Australia at this point, technological innovations 
that are being explored, particularly small modular reactors, have the potential 
to change that significantly.11 Only hydropower displaces more carbon emissions 
than nuclear energy, and Australia is already utilising nearly all of its practically 
available hydropower resources. 
Behavioural economics indicates that a human desire to eliminate extreme risks, 
particularly those with vividly memorable outcomes and negative emotional con-
sequences, can result in decisions that accept more moderate risk but which has 
higher probability.12 While rejecting nuclear energy may eliminate an extreme form 
of risk, that can be kept to a very low probability of occurrence, for example the 
risk of a significant radiation leak, the decision means achieving less mitigation 
and so accepting a lower probability of avoiding 
extreme climate change. 
Creating a social licence, either for nuclear power 
or other forms of low greenhouse gas emissions 
technologies, represents a direct action that would 
improve the ability of the nation to meet its climate 
mitigation objectives without unnecessary costs. 
Australia should ‘purchase’ a call option on the 
ability to deploy nuclear power by developing a 
suitable regulatory framework and beginning to 
develop relevant domestic skills now. These relatively cheap actions would help 
position Australia to take advantage of all technological developments. It would 
also help Australia to develop more value adding activity in the nuclear energy 
space, potentially the most significant contribution Australia can make to mitigat-
ing global climate change. 
Taking effective action
The Emissions Reduction Fund, as currently configured, is likely to continue the 
trend of using Australia’s resources wastefully while achieving limited mitigation of 
climate change. It need not. Properly configured, the Emissions Reduction Fund 
could make an effective contribution by enhancing the value of Australia’s port-
folio of options and seeking to capture the NPV associated with low greenhouse 
gas emission technologies. 
An important way of enhancing the value of a portfolio of options is to extend 
their expiry date, other things being equal. In the context of Australia’s port-
folio of options, if the nation can meet its greenhouse gas emission reduction 
“ Creating a social licence, either for nuclear 
power or other forms of low greenhouse gas 
emissions technologies, represents a direct 
action that would improve the ability of the 
nation to meet its climate mitigation objectives 
without unnecessary costs.”
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targets relative to 2000 levels without the need to deploy relatively expensive low 
greenhouse gas emission technologies, it is effectively extending the expiry date 
associated with those technological options. This gives time for further techno-
logical breakthroughs to occur and reduces the overall subsidy necessary to 
make it competitive. The marginal abatement cost curve modelling conducted 
by Climate Works suggests that energy efficiency improvements would both save 
money while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and may contribute significantly 
to Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions targets.13 
Extending the expiry of Australia’s portfolio of call options would be a positive 
act in itself. However, investing funds focused on the technological developments 
that would enhance the value of low greenhouse gas emissions technology, par-
ticularly in areas such as CCS that are strategically important to Australia, would 
also significantly enhance the portfolio of options. 
To optimise Australia’s portfolio of responses to climate change and to take effec-
tive action requires the following process: 
•	 Regularly update the Australian Energy Technology Assessment; 
•	 Assign probabilities to these forecasts and identify the technological break-
throughs that would underpin reduced future levelised costs of energy 
assessments; 
•	 Forecast the future costs over time for greenhouse gas emissions (proxied by 
global carbon prices) to determine the NPV of alternative low greenhouse gas 
emissions technologies; and
•	 Use a real options investment approach to maximise the potential greenhouse 
gas emissions that Australia can efficiently mitigate.
This approach would focus on maximising the potential to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions rather than focusing on directly mitigating greenhouse gas emis-
sions now with inadequate technologies. Considering the pace of technological 
change for low greenhouse gas emissions technologies, both experienced and 
anticipated, this would make a substantial difference to the amount of green-
house gas emissions that could be mitigated for a given level of funding. For 
the Emissions Reduction Fund this would involve encouraging energy efficiency 
improvements to meet Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets 
while also using the insights of the options analysis to spend funds on means to 
maximise emissions reductions over the longer term. 
Adopting a real options investment analysis to mitigating climate change would 
provide a great deal more certainty for decision-makers. It would focus the politi-
cal debate on exactly what Australia is ‘buying’ with its efforts to mitigate climate 
change and point the way towards a constructive discussion on the value of 
various approaches to minimising climate change. Having explicit assumptions 
underpinning Australia’s greenhouse gas emission reduction actions would allow 
for greater contestability, and eventually greater cohesiveness in terms of policy 
direction. 
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 Key examples of ways in which the potential for low greenhouse gas emissions 
could be encouraged include: 
•	 Focusing R&D on enabling specific technology breakthroughs, such as those 
identified as necessary for geothermal power to become commercially viable; 
•	 Developing robust regulatory regimes for all energy sources prior to their deploy-
ment, including nuclear power;
•	 Working to ensure a social licence to operate exists for all energy sources, 
including nuclear power and wind generation; 
•	 Integrating low greenhouse gas emissions energy sources with the transmission 
and distribution system; and
•	 Developing domestic skills in implementing the initial investments in emerging 
technologies. 
This would not be technologically neutral. Instead it would focus on trying 
to capture as much of the potential positive NPV of each low greenhouse gas 
emission technology. While this may result in greenhouse gas emissions being 
marginally higher in the short term, Australia would be spending funds to maxi-
mise their long-term reduction. 
Endnotes
1  steffen, W., Crutzen, P. J., and mcneill, J., R., The Anthropocene: Are humans now overwhelming the great forces of nature?, ambio, 
Vol 36, number 8, December 2007, pp. 614-621. 
2  australian academy of Technological sciences and Engineering, December 2008, Energy technology for climate change: Accelerating 
the technology response. 
3  iPCC Wgiii aR5, summary for policymakers, page 15 http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-
policymakers_approved.pdf
4  iPCC Wgiii aR5, summary for policymakers, page 17 http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-
policymakers_approved.pdf
5  Briscoe, J., 2011, The Australian Water Project, Crisis and opportunity: Lessons of Australian water reform, Volume 1, page 12. 
6  australian academy of Technological sciences and Engineering, november 2010, Low carbon energy: Evaluation of new energy 
technology choices for electric power generation in Australia and, Burgess, J., may 2012 financial uncertainty of technological change, 
CEDa. 
7  CEDa, april 2013, Healthcare: Reform or ration. 
8  Burgess, J., Financial uncertainty of technology change, Renewables and efficiency, CEDa Policy Perspective, 2011.
9  Klob g J, ho C K, mancini T R, gary J a, Power Tower Technology Roadmap and Cost Reduction Plan, 2011, sandia national 
laboratories, Usa Department of Energy, sanD2011-2419, april.
10  Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Energy White paper 2012: australia’s energy transformation, page 98, http://www.aip.
com.au/pdf/Energy_%20White_Paper_2012.pdf 
11 irwin, T., Small Modular Reactors, australia’s nuclear options, CEDa Policy Perspective, 2011. 
12  De martino, B, Kumaran, D, seymour, B, and Dolan R J, 2006, frames, biases and rational decision making in the human brain, science 
313, 684 687
13 Climate Works australia, marginal abatement cost curve, accessible from here: http://www.climateworksaustralia.org/
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
58
Acknowledgements
national 
accenture australia
aCil allen Consulting
aECom
aEmo
allens
anZ
aon Risk services
arup
asciano
australia Post
Bankwest 
BhP Billiton
Cardno
Clayton Utz
Commonwealth Bank  
of australia
CPa australia
CsC
Deloitte
Evans & Peck
EY
fleetPartners
g4s
CEDA would like to acknowledge the following members and individuals who 
have contributed to CEDA’s general research fund between 30 May 2013 and 
30 May 2014.
CEDA undertakes research with the objective of delivering independent, evi-
dence-based policy to address critical economic issues and drive public debate 
and discussion. It could not complete its research agenda without the support of 
these contributions.
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
59
Acknowledgements
herbert smith freehills
hyder Consulting
iBm australia
institute of Chartered 
accountants in australia
Jacobs 
John holland 
KBR
KPmg
macquarie group services
mcKinsey & Company
microsoft
minerals Council  
of australia
mitsubishi australia
navitas
norton Rose fulbright
nous group
oamPs
Parsons Brinckerhoff
Philips Electronics 
australia
Pitt & sherry
Reserve Bank of australia
Rio Tinto
Rsm Bird Cameron
serco australia
shell Company  
of australia
siemens
Transfield services
TRiliTY
URs
ACt
austrade
australian Bureau  
of statistics
australian national 
University
CsiRo 
Defence housing australia
federal Department  
of Education
nsW
aCCa
adelaide Brighton
aPa group
ashurst
australian Catholic 
University
australian Computer 
society
australian Energy market 
Commission
australian Payments 
Clearing association
Barangaroo Delivery 
authority
Bloomberg
BlueChip Communication 
group
BoC
Business Events sydney
Cement, Concrete and 
aggregates australia 
Coag Reform Council
Community services  
and health industry  
skills Council
eBay australia  
and new Zealand
Edelman
Energy action
Everything infrastructure
Export finance and 
insurance Corporation
four seasons hotel 
sydney
ghD
gilbert + Tobin
health Direct australia 
henry Davis York
holcim australia
hunter Water Corporation
infigen Energy
infrasol group
insurance australia group
JP morgan
JBa
KJa
leighton Contractors
leighton holdings
malcolm naylor
manpower services 
australia new Zealand
marsh
merrill lynch australia
national insurance 
Brokers association of 
australia
niCTa
nsW Department of 
attorney general and 
Justice
nsW Department 
of Planning and 
infrastructure
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
60
nsW Department of 
Premier and Cabinet
nsW Department of 
Trade and investment, 
Regional infrastructure 
and services
nsW Environment 
Protection authority
nsW Treasury Corporation
Pacific strategy Partners
Parramatta City Council 
Phillip isaacs
Plenary group 
PwC australia
Regional Development 
australia hunter
snowy hydro
sydney airport
sydney Business school, 
University of Wollongong
sydney Catchment 
authority
sydney City Council
sydney Water
The Bank of 
Tokyo-mitsubishi
The BPaY group
The future fund
The Royal Bank of 
scotland
The University of sydney 
Business school
Thorn group
Transport nsW
University of newcastle
University of new south 
Wales
University of Technology 
sydney
Water services 
association of australia
QlD
agl Energy
arrow Energy
Bank of Queensland
Civil Contractors 
federation
ConocoPhillips
Energex
Ergon Energy
fa Pidgeon & son
gadens
ghD
hastings Deering australia
ian Davies
ipswich City Council
James Cook University 
leyshon
local government 
association of Queensland 
logan City Council
lutheran Community Care
mandalay Technologies
marchment hill Consulting
mcCullough Robertson 
lawyers
morgans
new hope group
noJa Power
Port of Brisbane
Puma Energy
PwC australia
QiC
Queensland Competition 
authority
Queensland Department 
of state Development, 
infrastructure and 
Planning
Queensland law society
Queensland motorways
Queensland Resources 
Council
Queensland Treasury 
Corporation 
Queensland Treasury and 
Trade
Queensland University of 
Technology
Regional Development 
australia south East 
Queensland 
Robert Walters
santoro Consulting
santos glng Project
senator sue Boyce
sunWater
The University of 
Queensland
Toowoomba and surat 
Basin Enterprise
UniQuest
Wingate Properties
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
61
sA
adelaide airport
australian Bureau of 
statistics
BDo
Bedford group
Business sa
City of Prospect
Codan
Coopers Brewery
Electranet
flinders Ports
flinders University
funds sa
hoshizaki lancer
nCVER
sa Department for 
manufacturing, innovation, 
Trade, Resources and 
Energy
sa Department of further 
Education, Employment, 
science and Technology
sa Department of 
Planning, Transport and 
infrastructure
sa Department of Primary 
industries and Regions
sa Department of the 
Premier and Cabinet
sa Power networks
sa Water Corporation
saCE Board
Thomson geer
University College london
University of south 
australia
Workskil 
tAs
aurora Energy
hydro Tasmania
nekon
Tasmanian Department of 
Economic Development, 
Tourism and the arts
Tasmanian Department of 
Premier and Cabinet
Transend networks
University of Tasmania
viC
australian Catholic 
University 
australian institute of 
management
australian Unity
Basf australia
Benetas
Box hill institute
Cabrini health
City of melbourne
Clean Energy Council
Csl
Deakin University 
Exxonmobil australia
ghD
gilbert + Tobin
ifm investors
independent Broad-Based 
anti-Corruption
Commission Victoria 
(iBaC)
independent schools 
Victoria
Jana investment advisers
Jo fisher Executive
la Trobe University
linking melbourne 
authority
litmus group
mackay Consolidated 
industries 
marchment hill Consulting
medibank
melbourne Water 
Corporation
monash University
monsanto
national australia Bank
nhP Electrical Engineering 
Products
open Universities 
australia
oppeus international
oracle Corporation 
australia
Pga management
Pitcher Partners
Public Transport Victoria
PwC australia
REa group
RmiT University
Royal australian College 
of general Practitioners 
south East Water
sustainability Victoria
Telstra
The Bank of 
Tokyo-mitsubishi
The future fund
The myer foundation
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
62
Thiess
Toyota motor Corporation 
australia
Transdev
Treasury Corporation of 
Victoria
United Energy and multinet 
gas
Urbis
Victorian Department of 
human services
Victorian Department of 
Premier and Cabinet
Victorian Department of 
Transport, Planning and 
local infrastructure
Victorian Department of 
Treasury and finance
VicTrack
Western Water
Wilson Transformer 
Company
Worksafe Victoria
WA
agi australia
aTCo australia
australian Bureau of 
statistics
Brookfield Rail
Chevron australia
CiTiC Pacific mining 
management
City of greater geraldton
City of Perth
Clifford Chance
ConocoPhillips
Dampier Bunbury natural 
gas Pipeline nominees
Edith Cowan University
fortescue metals group
georgiou group
gerard Daniels
gfR
grose international
hassEll
horizon Power
K&l gates
King & Wood mallesons 
landCorp
lavan legal
leighton Contractors
main Roads, Western 
australia
murdoch University
optamaX
Pilbara Development 
Commission
Public sector Commission
synergy
The Chamber of minerals 
and Energy of Western 
australia
The University of Western 
australia
Toro Energy
UnitingCare West
Wa Department of 
agriculture and food
Wa Department of Regional 
Development
Wa Department of Treasury
Wa Department of Water
Wa Water Corporation
Wa Treasury Corporation
Wesfarmers
Woodside Energy
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
63
CEDA board of Directors
Geoff Allen AM
national Chairman, CEDa; Director, aCil allen Consulting;  
and founder and former Director allen Consulting group
Angus Armour
Deputy Director general – industry, innovation, hospitality and the arts,  
nsW Department of Trade and investment, Regional infrastructure and services
Dr John Edwards
Board member, Reserve Bank of australia
Patricia Faulkner AO
Chair of the national health Performance authority and member of the Coag Reform Council
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin
Chief Executive, CEDa
Mary Ann O’Loughlin AM
Executive Councillor and head of the secretariat, Coag Reform Council
Dr Sally Pitkin
Consultant, Clayton Utz
Ian Satchwell
Director – international mining for Development Centre
Catherine Sinclair
Director, The Consultancy Bureau
Stephen Spargo
Partner, allens
Andrew Stevens
managing Director, iBm australia and new Zealand
Ian Stirling
CEo, Electranet 
Professor Glenn Withers AO
Professor of Economics, Crawford school of Public Policy, australian national University
T h E  E C o n o m i C s  o f  C l i m a T E  C h a n g E
64
CEDA board of governors
martin albrecht aC
geoff allen am
laureate Professor adrienne Clarke aC
ivan Deveson ao
Professor Julian Disney ao
laureate Professor Peter Doherty aC
Peter Duncan
The Rt hon. malcolm fraser aC
Professor margaret gardner ao
The hon. sir James gobbo aC
The hon. nick greiner aC
Professor sandra harding
Dr allan hawke aC
The hon. Robert hawke aC
Elaine henry oam
Dr Ken henry aC
The hon. John howard aC
graham Kraehe ao
John langoulant ao 
Catherine livingstone ao
Professor the hon. stephen martin
John massey
Paul mcClintock ao
Dr stuart mcgill
andrew mohl
Terry moran aC
David mortimer ao
Warren mundine
John Phillips ao
Dr Kerry schott
Dr John schubert ao
Dr Ziggy switkowski
Richard Warburton ao lVo
Peter Wills aC
National
Level 13, 440 Collins Street 
Melbourne VIC 3000  
GPO Box 2117 
Melbourne VIC 3001 
Telephone 03 9662 3544 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
New South Wales  
and the ACT
Level 14 
The John Hunter Building 
9 Hunter Street 
Sydney NSW 2000 
GPO Box 2100 
Sydney NSW 2001 
Telephone 02 9299 7022 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
Queensland
Level 17, 300 Adelaide Street 
Brisbane QLD 4000 
GPO Box 2900 
Brisbane QLD 4001 
Telephone 07 3229 9955 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
South Australia and the  
Northern Territory
Level 7  
144 North Terrace 
Adelaide SA 5000 
PO Box 8248, Station Arcade 
Adelaide SA 5000 
Telephone 08 8211 7222 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
Victoria and Tasmania
Level 13, 440 Collins Street 
Melbourne VIC 3000 
GPO Box 2117 
Melbourne VIC 3001 
Telephone 03 9662 3544 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
Western Australia
Level 5  
105 St Georges Terrace 
Perth WA 6000 
PO Box 5631, St Georges Tce 
Perth WA 6831 
Telephone 08 9228 2155 
Email info@ceda.com.au 
